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This dissertation is concerned with an empirical estimation of 
the supply of labor in terms of hours of work for low-income family 
heads. More specifically, the purpose is to estimate the relation 
between hours worked and sources and levels of income as well as hourly 
wages, controlling for the effects of other market and personal factors. 
The study utilizes specified groups selected from the 1967 survey 
of Economic Opportunity data. The primary focus is on those family 
units who qualify for benefits under the provision of the proposed 
Family Assistance Plan; however, other groups are specified for compar-
ative purposes. 
The procedure basically is to estimate', using multivariate regres-
sion analysis, the supply relation for each of the various groups. 
Interactions and intercorrelations among the explanatery variables are 
explored. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study is concerned with the effects on work effort of those 
benefits which can be set or adjusted by income maintenance programs. 
Xncome Maintenance Programs 
Existing programs related to income maintenance and public assist-
ance make up a complex, uncoordinated and inadequate system. Many 
income maintenance programs were not designed for the purpose of 
alleviating poverty. Such federally sponsored programs as Old Age, 
Survivors, Disability, and Health Insurance (OASDHI) and the state-
federal system of unemployment insurance provide benefits based primar-
ily on prior taxable income rather than benefits based solely on a 
need criterion. The federally aided public assistance program, Aid 
To Families With Dependent Children (AFDC), is inadequate in the relief 
of poverty in terms of both individual coverage and adequacy of bene-
1 
fits, and in addition is believed to have adverse effects on work 
incentives. 
The original intent and objectives of the AFDC program have 
changed over time and the program has been modified to reflect these 
1 changes. Growing concern in Congress over the operation of the AFDC 
1A discussion of these modifications is found in the Manpower 
Report .2.f the President, 1970, pp. 148-158. 
2 
pro~tam has been manifest in recent years. This political concern is 
larkely due to mounting welfare caseloads, coexistent with a generally 
preSperous national economy, and the rising cost of the program. 
The Nixon Administration's proposed Family Assistance Plan (FAP) 
was designed as an attempt to completely replace the AFDC program with 
new federal legislation. FAP thus generated increased interest and 
controversy concerning the appropriate provisions needed to alleviate 
poverty. FAP differs from existing programs in three respects: (1) 
a federally financed income guarantee is provided in an attempt to 
establish a minimal floor under the income of the eligible poor; (2) 
, I 
cash benefits are extended to include the currently excluded working 
poor; (3) provision is made for largely federal administration of the 
2 
new program to assure its uniform application among the states. 
The Incentive Issue 
All proposed income subsidy schemes are concerned with the problem 
of maintaining work incentives of the poor. Kesselman gives some 
reasons for concern with this problem: 
Several reasons account for the paramountcy of the incentives 
question in the treatment of this important public issue [in-
come maintenance]. Of course, there are the purely economic 
reasons for ~oncern.--the cost of the program to the govern-
ment and to society depend upon the degree of work curtail-
ment under a subsidy scheme. If a maintenance program is to 
achieve its primary objective of raising low incomes, it 
must not allow its beneficiaries to reduce their earnings 
too much. And if the internal tax rate of a maintenance 
program must be kept low to avoid large disincentives to 
work, then the program will have to cover many of the non-
poor as well. Longer-run and less crystallized economic 
2Glen C. Cain and Leonard J. Hausman, "The Family Assistance Plan: 
An Analysis and Evaluation," A policy statement of the National Manpower 
Policy Task Force Associates, Washington, D. C., April 17, 1970, p. 1. 
notions also enter into the fee1ing that a maintenance system 
should be designed so as not to discourage work on any sub-
stantial scale. _It is widely held that the only long-run 
relief for .the poor is their upgrading for absorption into 
the more highly productive parts of the economy. Beyond such 
economi~ reasoning looms a tacit realization that society is 
not eager to.enact a program which allows the poor to receive 
public funds and yet work less [Puritan work ethic]3 
Zeckhauser and Schuck note that work incentive schemes serve at 
least two major social and economic purposes: 
First, work incentives, by reducing labor force defections, 
integrate the employable poor into the larger society and 
enchance its [society's] and their economic vitality. Second, 
work incentives,_by subjecting the employable poor to the 
motivating force of higher wages, permit the labor market 
to allocate workers efficiently among firms, industries and 
geographical areas.4 
Great care is being taken to assure Congress that any revision of 
federal statues to provide income transfers to poor families will 
include strong· incentives to promote "(vork-effort by (at least) recipient 
heads-of-household. 
Problem: The Correlates of Work Effort 
While there is much discussion about measures that are necessary 
to evoke desired levels of effort from potential recipients of govern-
ment transfers, there is in fact a very meager understanding of the 
correlates of work effort. Static work-leisure choice theory suggests 
that the income and substitution effects associated with a change in 
the effective wage' rate counteract each other, so the expected effect 
3Johnathan Kesselman, "Labor-Supply Effects of Income, Income-Work, 
and Wage Subsidies," Journal of Human Resources, IV:3 (Summer, 1969), 
pp. 275-276. 
4Richard Zeckhauser and Peter Schuck, "An Alternative to the Nixon 
Income Maintenance Plan," ~Public Interest, No. 19 (Spring, 1970), 
p. 122. 
4 
of (say) a wage subsidy on work effort cannot be determined ~ Eriori. 
Consider the effect on work effort of a positive lump sum cash 
transfer combined with an increase in the effective tax rate, as exists 
9 in most negative income tax proposa.ls. The increased tax rate can be 
considered as a reduction in the effective wage rate. A wage rate 
reduction lowers the price of leisure relative to income. The income 
effect of this price change is to reduce the amount of leisure consumed 
(increase in work effort), while the substitution effect is to acquire 
more leisure because of its now lower relative price (reduction in 
work effort). The net effect of the increased tax rate on work effort 
is thus indeterminant. 
The lump sum cash transfer produces an income effect that results 
in the increased consumption of leisure, provided leisure is considered 
a "normal" good. This leisure inducing income effect will be larger 
than the opposing income effect associated wi,th the increased tax rate, 
since the tax rate is some percentage, such as 50 per cent, of the 
cash transfer. The net effect between the two income effects coupled 
with the substitution effect should lead to a reduction in work effort. 
Intertemporal considerations have led both Baskin and Conlisk to. 
suggest that the predictions concerning work effort associated with a 
positive lump sum cash transfer combined with a constant tax rate on 
earnings may be reversed with the passage of time. 10 
9see Christopher Green, "Negative Taxes and Monetary Incentives to 
Work: The Static Theory," The Journal of Human Resources, III, No. 3 
(Summer, 1968), p. 286-287. 
lOMichael J. Baskin, "The Negative Income Tax and the Supply of 
Work Effort," The National Tax Journal, XX (December, 1967), pp. 353-
367, and John Cdnlisk, "Simple Dynamic Effects in Work-Leisure Choice: 
A SkeptiCal Comment on the Static Theory," The Journal of Human 
Resources, III.3 (Summer, 1968), pp. 324-326. 
Little is known about the ef~ects of positive marginal tax rates 
on work incentives. Since the marginal tax rate can be set indepen~ 
dently of the level of the cash transfer, it ·is ·important to have some 
knowledge of the income and substitution effect of a tax (wage) rate 
·change. These effects are estimated in this study. 
Informed decisions about appropriate income transfer programming 
5 
cannot be made without a better understanding of the price-work effort 
relation. The current experimental income transfer program being 
I 
conducted in Pen~~ylvania and New Jersey by Mathematica-Princeton and 
The Institute for Research on Poverty - University of Wisconsin, will 
provide the first direct test of the work-effort effect of alternative 
tax-transfer schemes. It will be several years before·the data from 
this experiment can be· analyzed and applied ·to public policy program-
ming. There is such an air of urgency at. the legislative level that 
it is almost certain that a tremendous amount of public sector money 
will be spent before these insights ar~. gained. 
This study will provide insight to the work incentive issue by 
estimating the supply relation in terms of hours worked per year, for 
selected groups of low-income family heads. As Bowen and Finegan note 
in the introduction to their recent definitive analysis of labor force 
participation, "labor supply depend1=1 of course on the degree of labor 
force participation, as reflected in annual hours worked, as well as 
on the number of individuals participating in the labor force at a 
. . . ..11 point in time ..•• 
11william G. Bowen and T. Aldrich Finegan, The Economics of Labor 
Force Participation, Princeton University Press, 1969, P• 3. 
6 
The proposed extension of benefit coverage under FAP to include 
the working poor would mean that decisions concerning work effort will 
probably concern hours of work rather than a work participation deci-
sion. 
It is noteworthy that almost hq:lf of the poor people in the 
United States are members of families with children with an 
able-bodied male head less than 65 years of age; that nearly 
sixty per cent of the l~tter group is poor despite the fact 
that the breadwinner holds a full-time, year-round job; and 
that among most of the remainder, the head works part-time 
the entire year or full-time for part of the year.12 
Three basic models have been employed to analyze variations in 
hours of work. 13 Studies have approached the problem from a demand or 
14 supply perspective, or have attempted a simultaneous determination of 
15 wages and hours via the forces of demand and supply. 
Since, as Rosen observed, " the observational units whose 
behavior is to be explained determine the most appropriate model 
design, 1116 the approach selected for this study dealing with household 
12cain and Hausman, p. 3. 
13see Ronald G. Ehrenberg, "The Short-Run Employment Decision and 
Overtime Behavior in U. S. Industry, 1966," (unpublished Ph.D. disserta-
tion, Northwestern University, 1970); Sherwin Rosen, "Short-Run Employ-
ment Variations on Class-I Railroads in the u; S. 1947-63," Econometri-
.£2:_, XXXVII (July, 1968), pp. 511-529; and Nadiri and Rosen, ''Inter-
related Factor Demand," American Economic Review, LDC (September, 1969), 
pp. 457-471. 
14since the approach adopted in this study is of this type, the 
related literature is cited in the following chapter. 
15see Sherwin Rosen, "On the Interi11-dustry Wage and Hours Struc-
ture," Journal of Political Economy, 'LXXVII (February, 1969), pp. 249-
273; and S. Black and H. Kelegian, "A Micro Model of the U. S. Labor 
Market," Princeton University Working Paper No. 10 (September, 1968). 
16A preliminary draft of Ro~en, dated October 12, 1967, cited by 
Ehrenberg, p. 12. 
heads of low-income families is based on a modified version of tradi-
tional income-leisure theory. 
7 
An implicit assumption of this approach is that the demand for 
hours of work per worker is infinitely elastic. In other words workers 
choose the quantity of hours they desire to work at a given wage rate. 
The validity of this assumption is explored in Chapter II. 
It should be noted that similar restrictive assumptions are neces-
sary concerning supply aspects for empi+ical analysis in studies dealing 
only with demand factors. The demand approach was not selected because 
of the conceptual difficulty associated with the demand for individual 
hours of work. 
Thesis Format 
This dissertation uses availab.le data from the 1967 OEO Survey 
of Economic Opportunity on low-income families, and a variant of Marvin 
Koster's widely adopted market-nonmarket choice model, to estimate the 
relation between hours worked and sources and levels of income as well 
as other market and personal factors. The supply relation will be 
estimated by means of multivariate regression analysis using the dis-
aggregated cross-section ~urvey data. 
The conceptual basis for the analysis of hours of work supplied 
to the market is presented in Chapter II. This presentation is followed 
by a theoretical discussion of the variables specified in the model and 
the· problems and limitations associated with the mod.el. 
The data and editing procedures are described in Chapter III. This 
study is concerned only with the civilian, nonfarm, low-income inter-
view units whose head was a wage earner. Four samples were separated 
8 
for analysis: working poor families with children (FAP sample), working 
·poor families and unrelated individuals without children (WP-WC), work-
ing near-poor families with children (WNP-C), and working near-poor 
families and unrelated individuals without children (WNP-WC). A 
detailed discussion of the measures available in the data and of the 
measures selected for the empirical analysis is also located in this 
chapter. 
The results of the empirical analysis are reported in Chapter IV. 
Multivariate regression analysis was employed to estimate the supply 
relation for each of the four samples previously mentioned. Within 
each sample separate regression equations were estimated for families 
grouped into the following categories: Worked full•time both weekly 
and hourly (FWFH); worked full-time weekly·, part-time hourly (FWPH); 
worked part-time weekly, foU-titne hourly (PWFH); wci!rked. part-time 
both weekly and hourly (PWPH)~ The finding of the interaction implicit. 
in the separation according to these categories is of significance. 
The effects of intercorrelations and interactions of selected 
variables on the wage and income terms were explored. Intercorre-
lations involving either wage or income terms with other selected 
explanatory variables were considered minor in most cases, especially 
for the FAP and WNP-C samples. Selected results based on regressions 
specified to include interaction terms for each group in the various 
samples are also reported. The significant interactions provide 
evidence concerning the different pattern of wage and income effects 
associated with various demographic factors. 
Market variables were considered in exploring demand related 
aspects; however, the results in terms of significant estimates were 
not of consequence and these variables were dropped from the final 
regl"essiens. 
9 
Significant findings and implications for manpower policy are 
presented in the final chapter. The chapter includes comparisons of 
work incentives among the various groups tested associated with income 
maintenance program provisions. 
CHAPTER II 
THEOR,ETICAL MODEL AND DISCUSSION OF VARIABLES 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a theoretical basis for an analysis of 
hours of work supplied to the market by low-income individuals. No 
claim of originality for this theoretical formulation is intended. 
The development of the theoretical model leads to the specifi-
cation of a labor ~upply equation applicable to cross-section data 
using individual and family unit observations. All variables are 
discussed in their theoretical context. The identification problem 
and some limitations and problem~ associated with the use of cross-
section data are also explored. Various restrictions inherent in 
the model as developed for regression analysis are enumerated in a 
concluding section. 
Becker's Theory of Time Allocation 
Two complementary theories of time allocation are found in the 
economics literature; one being a less inclusive subset of the other. 
The more general theory, formalized by Gary Becker, treats the cost 
1Gary S. Becke'£, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," Economic 
Journal, LXXV (September, 1965), pp. 493-517. Many of the ideas 
. developed by Becker originated from Jacob Mincer 1 s study, "Labor Force 
Participation of Married Women," Aspects of Labor Economics, NBER 




1 of time on the same level as the cost of market goods. The less 
inclusive theory is the traditional work-leisure choice theory which 
has be'ert developed and refined by several writers~ 2 According to the 
traditional theory, families maximize utility functions of the form, 
where the y. are market goods and leisure is treated as one of these 
1-
goods, subject to the budget constraint, 
P Y = Y = E + V, i i 
where the p. are market prices of these goods, Y is money income, E 
1-
is earnings income, and V is other income. 
In Becker's formulation time and market goods are inputs in the 
production of basic commodities, which are then combined to maximize 
family utility. This can be written as 
Z. = f. (x., T.) (i = 1, ••• ,m), 
1- 1- 1- 1-
where Z. commodities are produced by a vector of market goods x. and 
1- 1-





since the opportunity cost of time varies according to the time period 
considered. It is assumed that all commodities require both time and 
market goods inputs, but in varying proportions. 
2 For a development of traditional theory, see Franklee Gilbert 
and Ralph W. Pfouts, "A Theory of the Responsiveness of Hours of Work 
to Changes in Wage Rates," Review of Economics and Statistics, XL 
(May, 1958), pp. 116-121. 
12 
Having produced these basic commodities, through the production 
functions (f.), families also choose among them to maximize utility, 
l. 
subject to the resource constraint, 
z 
where g is an expenditure function of Z., and Z is the resource or 
]. 
budget constraint. 
Since Z is a function of Z., Z is also a function of both time 
]. 
and market goods. It is necessary that Z be a joint constraint of 
time and goods bec;mse time can be converted into goods by reducing 
(4) 
(5) 
the time spent at consumption (T = 
c 
'1 m T.) and 
1-ii=l ]. 
increasing the time 
at work (T ), assuming that total time (T) is equal w . . . 
combined constraint can be written as 




to T + T • The 
c w 
By rewriting the production function (3) in the form 
T. t.Z. 
]. ]. ]. 
x. b.Z., 
1, ]. ]. 
where t. is a vector of time input and b. is a vector of goods input 
]. ]. 





s = m ~ 11.Z., 
L.J.l ].]. 
1= 
letting 1ii = p;b,+ t: w 
]. ]. ]. 
(8) 
and S = V + TW. 
The consumption of commodities is thus maximized subject to a budget 
constraint where the cost of commodities is the sum of the cost of 
direct market goods inputs and the indirect cost of productive time 
foregone. 
If W is assumed constant and if there are constant returns in 
producing Z., so that bi and t. are fixed for given p. and W, maxi-
1 ]. ]. 
mizing family utility subject to the budget constraint gives 
(9) 
for i - 1, .•. m, where A is the marginal utility of money income. 
If W is not constant and if marginal wage rates are less than 
I 
average wage rates, then S overstates the budget constraint. This 
problem led Becker to introduce the concept of !£11 income, S, which 
is the maximum money income available, 
where Y is money income and L is foregone money income. Both Y and L 
are functions of the Z. because the decision to produce or consume 
1 
depends on the commodity set selected. Full income is either spent on 
.14 
market goods or is "spent" on foregone earnings, as stated by the 
equation 
(11) 
Even with the budget constraint in the more general form, a 
separation of total marginal prices into both direct and indirect 
components may be possible under certain conditions. The equilibrium 
conditions resulting from maximizing the utility functions subject to 
(11) may be written as 
The marginal cost of Zi is the sum of bi (pi + ci) and ti li, where ci 
is the marginal foregone earnings of using more goods onZi, and li 
··is the marginal foregone earnings of using more time on zi. Ollly if 
c. = 0 is the direct-indirect cost dichotomy valid. In the analysis 
l. 
that follows, it is assumed that ci • 0, and bi and ti are constant 
(fixed factor proportions). Under these assumptions, bipi is the 
marginal cost associated with using goods while tili is the marginal 
cost of using time in t-he production of Zi. 
Becker applies this theoretical framework to the determinants of 
hours worked by considering the effects of earnings, incomie, and 
market prices on Tc, and .. t;herefore residually on Tw' since T-Tc • Tw. 




1. = foregone earnings per hour, 
l. 
t. = number of hours used per un;i.t of z., 
l. l. 
pi = market price of goods, 
b. = number of goods per unit of z1 • l. 





p.b .. + l.t. 
l. l. l. l. 
Connnodities with smaller values for ¢ and y are preferred for 
consumption over those with larger values. The marginal importance 
of foregone earnings will be greater the larger the amount of time 
used per unit of z. (t.) and the larger the cost (foregone earnings) 
l. ],. 
per unit of time (li). The higher the values of pi and bi, the 
smaller the size of both ¢i and yi. Finally, y. will be larger, the 
l. 
greater the value oft .• Only if 1. were the same for all conunodities 
l. l. 
could the importance of foregone earnings be determined by only time 
intensity. 
The foregoing model can be used to explain traditional income 
and substitution effects. Suppose full income (S) increases due to 
an increase in nonearnings income (V), relative conunodity prices 
remaining unchanged. The consumption of most conunodities will be 
increased since the budget constraint (S) is larger. If the consum~-
ti on of an commodities increases, T c 
would increase since T = c 
·~ t. and m, l. the number of conunodities, increases. This in,come 
effect would result in a decrease in hours worked because T = T - T • w c 




Next, consider the effects of a compensated increase in earnings 
(the substitution effect). The effect of a rise in earnings (W) is 
fully compensated by a decline in nonearnings income. The increase 
in W would increase foregone earnin~s per hour (1.) uniformly for all 
l. 
commodities; however, relative prices would change because t. varies 
l. 
among commodities. There would be a greater increase in l.t., and 
l. l. 
therefore in¢·• for time-intensive commodities. Thus, a compensated 
l. 
increase in earnings would result in a substitution of goods-intensive 
for earnings-intensive commodities, (l.t.), and since earnings and 
l. l. 
time intensity (t.) are normally positively correlated unless 1. and 
l. l. 
t. are strongly negatively correlated; this means that T would 
l. w 
increase and T decrease. If l.ti and t. were negatively correlated, 
c l. ' l. 
a compensated increase in W would result in a substitution toward 
time-intensive commoditie~ resulting in an increase in T and a 
c 
reduction in T • 
w 
An uncompensated increase in earnings would result in a combina-
tion of the income and substitution effects discussed above, so the 
net effect on T is indeterminate a priori. 
w 
A Comparison of the Becker and 
Work-Leisure Theories 
The results associated with an increase in nonearnings income 
and an increase in both the compensated and uncompensated earnings 
cases are consistent with traditional work-leisure (W-L) analysis; 
however, the W-L theory, in which the cost of all other commodities 
17 
is only market goods, is a special case of Becker's more general 
approach. As a description of reaUty the W-L approach is not tenable 
since all commodities require a time input. 
Becker also recognizes the interdependency in the allocation of 
time among commodities for various persons within a family. Each 
person's allocation of time depends on his productivity in both the 
market and nonmarket sectors compared with those of the other family 
members. Each member would tend to specialize at the task in which 
he is relatively more efficient. 
The difficulty in distinguishing leisure from other forms of 
nonwork activity, and even nonwork from work activity is solved by 
using Becker's approach since all the traditional results can be 
reached without introducing the concept of leisure, Becker reaches 
all the traditional results by stressing that commodities differ in 
the relative importance of time. 
A shortcoming of Becker's theory is associated with the empirical 
testing of the model, which requires knowledge of the rate of transfor-




Although not currently available, per:haps as Becker mentions, 
agencies that collect information on the expenditure of money 
income might simultane.ously collect information on the 'expenditure' 
of time, 114 
3william G. Bowen and T. Aldrich Finegan, The Economics of Labor 
Force Participation (Princeton, 1969), p. 570. 
4 Becker, p. 517. 
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A Hybrid Model for Empirical Specification 
The model used in this study incorporates both the concepts 
developed by Becker and elements of the W-L approach. The full, or 
potential, income concept is utilized while the concept of leisure as 
a unique commodity having special properties is avoided. 
The primary reason for adopting this hybrid model is that it 
allows specification of a cross-section labor supply relation. Short-
comings and limitations of this approach will be presented after the 
model has been formally developed. 
The family labor supply model adopted here follows that of 
Marvin Kosters in most dimensions. 5 The family, which is the unit of 
analysis, determines who works, the number of hours worked, and the 
length of employment. 
The variables and corresponding symbols used in the development 
of the model are: 
y = total income available to the family, y = 
Y =market money income. 
m 
y + v. 
m 
V = income from nonemployment sources accruing to the family 
during the period defined for T. 
5The following mathematical development paraphases the presenta-
tion in Marvin Kosters, "Income and Substitution Parameters in a 
Family Labor Supply Model," (f-3339, the RAND Corporation, December, 
1966). Also see his paper, "Effects of an Income Tax on Labor Supply," 
(P-3757, the RAND Corporation, January, 1968). 
Helpful insights into the mathematical development that follows 
are found in an unpublished paper by C. Russell Hill, who is currently 
doing research at the University of Michigan on the determinants of 
labor supply of the urban poor. 
T = total number of hours per person available to be spent in 
in labor market activity and nonmarket activity in the time 
period considered. 
T . =time spent in nonmarket activity in hours by the ith person. 
Ill. 
Although T can be interpreted as leisure time, it should be 
n 
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interpreted, according to Becker, as time spent at consuming 
commodities (Z1 , •.• ,m) which is determined by the relative 
marginal importance of foregone earnings per unit of Z. 
L 1 b 1 . d b h . th . h . = a or supp ie y t e i~ person in ours. 
l. 
p3 = price of after-tax money income; the number of dollars worth 
of time spent in nonmarket activity, which is evaluated at 
gross wage rates, that must be given up for one dollar's worth 
of after-tax market income. (p3 is assumed equal to unity.) 
W. =wage rate in dollars per hour for the ith person. 
l. 
i = 1 or 2 for the family head (husband~ where present) and spouse 
respectively. 
F = full or potential income. 
Z = commodities that are consumed by the family. 
The general model developed here assumes that the family unit 
contains only two persons (husband and wife) who are potential provid-
ers of some market time, and each of whom has the following time 
constraint: 
T = T . + L. (i = 1,2). 
Ill. l. 
(15) 
The family has a given amount of income from nonemployment sources 
and income from employment which is available to be spent on consu~ption 
20 
goods. The budget constraint may be written 
(16) 
Total family income is not the appropriate income concept relevant 
for the allocation decision of the family member's time between market 
and nonmarket activity. Total family income reflects decisions that 
have already been made concerning labor-force behavior rather than 
serving as a determinant of labor-force behavior. Full or potential 
income is a more appropriate income concept. Full income is obtained 
by determining the total value of time for each family member and adding 
income from nonemployment sources. An individual's total time (T) is 
evaluated by assuming his wage rate is applicable to both the market 
and nonmarket components of time. Full income may be written as: 
;z 
F = V + D 
i=l 










subject to the budget constraint (18). It is assumed that the family's 
utility function is a monotonic increasing function of the family's 
preference ordering, everywhere differentiable, and has the proper 
( / 
•t 6 convexi. y. 
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Applying the Lagrangian multiplier technique, A, and differenti-
ating, 
the necessary conditions for a constrained maximum are obtained: 
ui - wi = o (i = 1,2) 
where Ui = ~~ . (i = 1,2) and u3 = *· Sufficiency is assured by the 
Ill. 
assumption of the form of the utility function. This assumption also 
allows Y and Tni to be treated as differentiable functions of p3 , Wi, 
V and T. 
The paritals of Tnl' Tn2 and Y with respect to the implicit 
variables are solved using Cramer's Rule, where the solutions are 
stated in utility terms and the interdependency of Tnl' Tn2 and Y 
are taken into account. 
Through appropriate substitutions, the solutions for the partial 
derivatives of quantities with respect to prices in terms of income 
oT . y 





oY can be obtained. 
~. 
J 
A first order approximation to changes 
supply may be written as: · 
6These assumptions were made explicit by Hill. 
dT . = 
ni 
2 oT . oT . L __.::.:. W + __;::_ dV (j and i = 1, 2) 
j=l oWj j av 
Substituting the income and substitution derivatives into equation 
22 
(22) 
(22), noting that L. = T - T . , a first-order approximation to changes 
i ni 




Integration of equation (23) yields the following supply equation, 
which i.s the basic equation "for" analysis: 
L. 
l. 
where i. - 1, 2 for husband and wife respectively 
a = constant of integration. 
L. fixed equilibrium values of L. which are determined by the 
l. l. 
utility maximizing conditions for given wage rates and 
nonemployment income. 
income effect. As Becker has shown, this term is negative 
if relatively time intensive connnodities are considered 
"normal" goods. 
W. =wage rate for i = 1, 2. 
(24) 
1· aL. aL. 
S = ___ i - L ___ i = an income compensated wage rate effect (J" and 
ij awj j av 
i = 1, 2 for husband and wife respectively). 
V = income from nonemployment sources. 
Equation (24) states that the number of hours supplied to the 
market by a given individual depends on his wage rate, the wage rate 
of his spouse and income from nonemployment sources. 
In the case where i = j, S .. is an own price derivative which 
l.J 
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means that it is an income compensated wage rate effect associated with 
the given individual's~ wage rate. This is a pure substitution 
effect and its algebraic sign is therefore positive. 
For the case where i ~ j, S .. is an income compensated cross price 
l.J 
derivative. The wage rate that is utilized in this case is that of the 
individual's spouse. The algebraic sign is negative if the husband and 
wife's nonmarket time are substitutes and positive if they are comple-
ments. 
The labor supply equation may be written in log-log (elasticity) 
form which assumes that the underlying structural relationship between 
the dependent and explanatory variables is curvilinear. The desirable 
aspect of the regression in logaritmic form is that the coefficient of 
the explanatory variables are equivalent to elasticities. The supply 
'relation was not estimated in logaritmic form since many of the explana-
tory variables, including the ;income variable, have observations with 
zero or negative values. This problem may be overcome by using the 
arithmetic values for variables which have zero or negative observa~ 
tions; however, it should be noted that a different structural relation 
results. 
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Discussion of Variables 
A desirable characteristic of these equations is that the labor 
supply eguatio·a is specified in terms of wage rates, labor supplied, 
and income from nonemployment sources; variables on which data can 
be obtained. The purpose of this section is to discuss these variables 
in gre~ter detail as well as to suggest other variables which are 
necessary to consider for proper specification and identification of 
the model. 
Dependent Variables: Hours Worked 
The decision to work (to allocate time to market activity) may 
be viewed as involving at least two choices. First, there is the 
choice of whether or not to seek market employment. The decision to 
seek such employment designates the subject as a "labor force partici-
pant," using current terminology, even if he is not successful in 
finding a job. The second choice is the number of hpurs of work a 
person is willing to accept per time period. 
The decision to seek (or hold) a job has received wide profes~ 
sional attention; therefore, discussion of this aspect of labor supply 
7 will not be included in this study, 
Equilibrium Hours, Ideally, the information that is desired is 
a measure of the equilibrium number of hours individuals in low-incom_e 
families would be willing to offer at alternative price (wage) levels, 
7The most recent culmination of work in this area is the previ~ 
ously cited work by Bowen and Fi.negano. Other.-r;eferences relating to 
to this aspect of labor supply are d ted there o · 
ceteris paribus. More specifically, as Kosters states, 
A comprehen$ive study of labor supplied would require 
inforIQ.Stion on the number of hours of work, standardized 
for intensity of effort, supplied during a person's life-
time given permanent measures of the market earning power 
and income ftom oth~r sources of the persons in the con-
sumer unit of which he is a member,8 
The term "equilibrium number of hours" raises the question, 
To what e~tent is it reasonable to suppose that mean hours 
worked by .•. groups of .indiv:idualS ·reprel!umts :an. app.rox~. 
imation of the equilibrium choices of hour by individuals 
responding to their opportunities (i.e., real wage rates), 
given their other economic circumstances?9 
The relation between average weekly hours and the wage rate is 
examined in this study by using data on individuals at a moment in 
time. lt should be noted that it is the average relationship that 
is being measured in dealing with data of ~conomic behavior; there-
25 
fore, individual observations are expected to deviate from the average. 
Do these data reflect hours largely imposed on workers by various 
factors such as demand, technolo&ical and legal constraints? It is 
not obvious that these ~actors are likely to dominate in the determi::-
nation of average hours of work during a given time period. Restating 
the question, does an incorrect average relationship between opportu-
nities (e.g,, real wage rates) and desired hours of work per time 
period by workers result because of failure to consider demand, techno-
logical, and legal constraints? Whether or not the measured estimate 
will be a biased estimate of a supply curve depends on -the relation of 
8 Kosters, "lncome and Substitution Effects in a Family Labor 
Supply Model," p, 22. 
9Belton M. Fleisher, Labor Economics: lheory and Evidence, 
Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1970, pp. 59. 
The discussion of this point is drawn largely from this source. 
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the omitted factors to the principle explanatory variable (wage rate). 
If the omitted variables are correlated with the wage rate, the rela-
tionship between weekly hours of work and wage rates will be a biased 
estimate of a supply curve. It is possible that the bias resulting 
from positively correlated excluded variables may be partially or 
wholly offset by negatively correlated excluded variables. It is 
assumed, for lack of information, that the omitted -factors are not 
correlated with the explanatory variables; therefore, a biased esti-
mate is assumed not to be obtained. 
This treatment of the equilibrium issue is clarified by 
10 
Ehrenberg. Hours of work can be divided into two components, its 
equilibrium component (L*) which is explained by the vector of explan-
atory variables derived from the theoretical model (X*), and its 
d disequilibrium component (L ) which is explained by a set of unobser-
able variables (Xd). Suppose that the true relationship is 
L 
n 
e ,_, n 2 (O,cr I), (26) 
where (~) and (e) are the vector of regression coefficients associated 
with (L*) and (Ld) respectively. For each individual, only (L) and 
-Jr: 
(X ) are observable. 
However, a well-known theorem states that if the omitted 
variables cxd) are uncorrelated with any of the remaining 
explanatory variables ex*), then regressing the dependent 
lORonald Gordon Ehrenberg, ·11The Short-Run Employment Decision 
and Overtime Behavior in U. S. Industry, 1966" (unpub. Ph.D. disser-
tation, Northwestern University), pp. 88-89. This development 
follows his exactly except that the discussion is in terms of 
different variables. 
variable [L] or the remaining explanatory variables (X*) 
will yield an unbiased estimate of their coefficients 
(13).11 
Explanatory Variables 
Each explanatory variable indicated in equations (24) and (25) 
will be discussed along with other variables incorporated in the 
ceteris paribus assumption of the model. The format will be to 
present the concept, the rationale for using it, and its expected 
relationship to the dependent variable (hours of work). 
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Wage ~ ~. 'l'he market earnings rate (wage rate) concept as 
used in this study is an hourly rate associated with individual family 
members. This market wage variable for a given individual gives his 
money· payoff to time spent i.n market activity, or the opportunity 
cost of an hour of nonmarket: activity, The market wage is only a 
partial measure, however, of opportunity cost since it does not 
encompass all elements of compensation and cost related to a given 
job. 
Ideally, the wage rate should be in real terms accounting for 
changes in prices as well as levels of fringe benefits and cost 
associated with working. Problems associated with the measurement 
of fringe benefits and job related costs. preclude their consideration 
in this study, Costs associated with the job may be of more concern 
to low~income persons than are fringe benefits, Prices are assumed 
constant because of the cro~s-sectional nature of the study. 
Unlike studies dealing with labor force participation, in studies 
11Ibid.' p. 89. 
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concerned with hours of work the wage rate variable has a known rather 
than only an expected value. This is not to imply that expectations 
are irrelevant in the latter type of study. Robert Lucas and Leonard 
Rapping have indicated that a household's current labor supply deci-
sions may well depend on current wage rates adjusted for the expecta-
tions about what will happen to that rate over time. 12 
The simplifying assumption is made that either expected wage 
rates equal current wage rates for the employed poor or that their 
expected and current wage rates are positively related. Under these 
assumptions, current wage rates may be considered as the appropriate 
wage concept for purposes of analysis. 
It can be argued that a negative relation between expected and 
current wage rates exists, In this case, an individual accepts a job 
with lower intital wage than he would otherwise have taken because he 
anticipates greater wage increases.over time. Considering the type 
jobs available to the low-income individuals and their limited vertical 
job mobility, it seems doubtful that the case is relevant for this 
group of individuals. 
The unemployed, on the other hand, do not have jobs; therefore 
current wage rates for a given job are not directly applicable to 
them. The labor supply decision facing these individuals is one of 
participation, thus wage considerations must be in terms of expected 
values. 
The wage rates for both the husband and spouse are considered for 
12Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and Leonard A. Rapping, "Real Wages, 
Employment, and Inflation," Journal of Political Economy, LXXVII 
(September/October, 1969), pp. 726-29. 
the following reason: 
The distribution of leisure, nonmarket work, and market 
work among family members depends on relative prices 
(wages) within the family specific to individual members, 
as well as on cultural or legal restraints or biological 
specialization of function. Earning powers of individual 
family members and marginal productivities in alternative 
pursuits differ among family members and this set of 
relative prices (wages) should affect the pattern of activ-. 
ity to which individual family members allocate their time. 13 
The correlation of an individual's wage rate, as well as the 
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spouse's wage rate, to own hours of work is indeterminant since each 
incorporate both a positive substitution effect and a negative income 
effect. 
Income from Nonemployment Sources fil· It is crucial in esti-
mating income and substitution effects that family income from sources 
other than earnings be a significant component of total family income 
for at least some families. 14 This is necessary because variation 
in family income independent of earnings can occur only to the 
extent that income is composed of something in addition to earnings. 
A negative association is expected between V and hours of work 
due to a pure income effect. Using Becker's terminology, as more 
commodities (Z) are purchased, additional time inputs are allocated 
to consumption of Z, therefore less time is available for market 
activity (work). 
Tastes. Taste f~ctors are assumed to be held constant in the 
development of the mathematical model; however, tastes are not assumed 
13 Kosters, "Income and Substitution Effects in a Family Labor 
Supply Model," p. 7. 
14Ibid., p. 20. 
to be identical''among families represented in cross~section data. 
The taste variables of major concern might be classified into 
three groups: (1) taste for money income, (2) taste for market work 
per ~' and (3) taste for nonmarket work. 15 Consideration will be 
given to the variables in each of these groups. 
(1) Taste for money income. Family size as well as the levels 
of both indebtedness and net assets may be correlated with taste for 
money income. 
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Michael Boskin indicates that the work effort of poor individuals 
may be positively associated with the level of indebtedness. This 
positive correlation may occur because "making payments will commit 
the worker to a·continued stream of income "16 A negative 
correlation may exist between the level of indebtedness and.work 
effort, however, if the debtwas incurred due to the purchase of time 
intensive consumption goods. 
Another aspect of taste for money income may be the net worth or 
net asset position of the family. The relation between hours worked 
and net worth is such that: 
If family uni.ts which supply labor are net (physical and 
money) asset holders .•. the q~antity 6f labor supplied 
at alternative. wages would tend to vary inversely with the 
level of real assets held by workers, ceteris paribus,17 
It i.s possible for a fam;i.ly with assets to choose not to work or 
15see Bowen and Finegan, 'p. 20. 
16Michael Baskin, "The Negative Income Tax and the Supply of 
Work Effort," National Tax Journal XX9 (December, 1967), p. 363. 
17Hirschel Kasper, "Assets and the Supply of Labor: A Note," 
Southern Economic Journal XXXIII, (October, 1966), p. 246. 
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to work fewer hours and to maintain consumption standards by liquida-
ting these assets in the absence of income from other sources. The 
length of time for which this alternative is possible depends, of 
course, on the net changes in the family's net worth position. 
Another possible explanation for an association between the level 
of net assets and hours worked is that the family may aspire to a 
18 target level of assets. Assets would be a consumption good and as 
more assets are acquired (consumed), the marginal utility of acquired 
assets would decline once the target level is reached, if dim:j..nishing 
returns had not already begun. Associated with the reaching of this 
target asset level is the increased consumption of commodities other 
than assets. Since commodities have a time component as well as a 
goods component, less time will be allocated to market activity. Thus, 
an inverse relation between hours worked and the level of net assets 
i.s expected based on Kasper's consideration as well as the target 
asset level hypothesis. 
It should be noted that collinearity problems may arise between 
net assets and nonearnings income (V). Generally, it would be expected 
that the larger the proportion of monetary return yielded by assets, 
the higher would be the correlation between net assets and nonearnings 
income. This point will be specifically dealt with in the next 
chapter; however, it would be expected intuitively that the problem 
would be minor for low-income families. 
18Although the section here was developed independently, see 
Karl Egge, "Intercolor Differences in Labor Supply Among Older Men" 
(Paper presented at the Winter Meetings of the Econometric Society, 
New York, December 30, 1969), p. 23. 
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Given the number of wage earners, the larger the size of the 
family the greater is the need (taste) for money income. This would 
mean a positive correlation between family size and hours of work 
should be observed. 
(2) Taste for market work~ se. Factors such as color, health, 
education, and marital status may reasonably be expected to affect 
the taste for market work per se. 
A difficulty associated with the use of color as a taste variable 
is that color may also be a surrogate for other factors, On the one 
hand, color may reflect differences in employment opportunity due to 
discrimination; while on the other, color may reflect taste or atti-
tude differences toward work effort. Nonwhites are expected to work 
fewer hours per year than whites. 
Health factors have been found to be among the more important 
influences on a family's taste for market work. As stated. by Bowen 
and Finegan, the health variable measures the "pain cost" associated 
, h . f k . . 19 w1.t varJ..ous types o· mar et actJ..vJ..ty. 
Karl Egge, in some preliminary work, found that the health 
variable had the highest explanatory power of the variables examined . 
. :;. 
The health measure used in Egge's study is whether or not the person 
has a work-affecting health problem which limits the kind or the 
amount of work he can perform or prevents him from working altogeth-
20 er. Poor health is expected to be associated with fewer hours of 
19 
Bowen and Finegan, p. 22. 
20 Egge, p. 24 
work. Egge states 
Because it limits his freedom to "choose" between work and 
leisure, poor health affects an individual's expected wage 
rate in future time periods, disrupts his retirement plans, 
affects his life expectancy, and acts as a type of techno-
logical constraint on the number of hours he can work.21 
It is possible that "cross effects" may be important in dealing 
with the health variable. An individual's choice of hours of work 
may depend on his spouse's health as well as his own. As noted by 
Hill, poor health of the spouse may lead an individual to work either 
more due to monetary considerations or less if nursing care is 
. d 22 require . 
Education probably also affects taste for market work. Two 
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reasons may be given for this association: First, educational attain-
ment may increase the enjoyment of work or enable the individual to 
work in jobs that are more satisfying; and secondly, the opportunity 
cost associated with staying out of the labor force is greater, the 
higher the level of education. 23 The second factor should result in 
a positive partial correlation between hours and schooling when other 
factors are held constant. 
There should also be a positive correlation between the .taste for 
market activity and the taste for education because investment in educa-
tion can yield a monetary return only if the individual engages in 
21 Ibid. 
22Hill 
23T. Aldrick Finegan, "Hours of Work in the United States: A 
Cross-Sectional Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, LXX (October, 
1962), p. 454. 
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market activity. This 1is unlike other forms of investment which yield 
a monetary return independent of the hours worked by the individua1. 24 
(3) Taste for nonmarket activity. The number of children in a 
family and taste for nonmarket activity are expected to be negatively 
correlated for family heads. This would give a positive relation 
between the number of children and hours worked by the family head. 
Hours worked in market activity by marri~d women may, however, be 
negatively related to the number of children; thus, the net effect of 
the number of children on total family hours of work is indeterminant. 
The sex variable should control for the taste for unpaid work in the 
home. Females, having greater taste for homework, would thus be 
expected to supply fewer hours per year than males. The taste for 
nonmarket activity is expected to be greater among both the older as 
well as the younger age groups; the older group because of grown 
families and accumulated wealth, the younger group because of greater 
vitality and out-of-doors orientation of act~vities. 
The difficulty in controlling for these taste factors is evident. 
It is hoped that such an inadequate control over tastes will only 
result in a smaller R2 of the regression and will not affect the 
estimates for the coefficients of the explanatory variables. 25 This 
means that unbiased estimates can be obtained provided the excluded 
variables are uncorrelated with the variables included in the regression 
equation. 
24 rbid. 




Generally, the maintained hypothesis concerning the process which 
generates the data used in studies of labor supply is simply the equi-
librium results of the interaction of demand and supply. "Each obser-
vation," M. S. Feldstein notes, "represents the intersection of one 
1 . ..26 particu ar supply curve and the corresponding demand curve ••• 
It is not difficult to visualize a process where shifts in the 
supply curve are so large relative to shifts in the demand curve 
that the resulting scatter of observations thus generated resembles 
a demand curve more closely than a supply curve. This type of bias 
is referred to as the "identification" problem because when it exists 
a regression line cannot be properly identified as being either a 
27 supply curve or a demand curve. 
In order to overcome the identification problem, variables in 
addition to wage rates and hours worked must be include<;'! in the equa-
tion to account for shifts of the supply curve between different obser-
vations. 28 The demand equation need not be estimated, although it 
must be specified to include at least one exogenEi!ous or predetermined 
variable not in the supply equation. 
Next, consider the discussion of the identification problem in 
26M. S. Feldstein, "Estimating the Supply Curve of Working Hours," 
Oxford Economic :Papers, XX (March, 1968), p. 75. 
27Fleisher, p. 31. 
28Feldstein, p. 77. 
29see A. C. Rayner, "On the Identification of the Supply Curve of 
Working Hours," Oxford Economic Papers, XXI (July, 1969), p. 294. 
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connection with cross-section data on individuals and consider the 
process whereby these observations are generated. A difficulty arises 
in attempting to conceptualize the demand facing an individual worker. 
In confronting this problem, the question becomes whether or not hours 
of work associated with various wage rates as reflected in the data 
are observations which can be interpreted only as measures of labor 
supply. 
If it is assumed that the data reflect equilibrium choices as to 
individual decisions between market and nonmarket activity, then the 
individual must be at the frontier of his supply curve. It is assumed 
that observations will not lie to the right to the individual's supply 
curve because the supply curve is a frontier concept. Neither will 
points lie to the left of the supply curve because of the assumption 
that .the individual is able to obtain his equilibrium choice. 
What is the role of demand under these conditions? It may be 
postulated that demand and supply in the market for a given type of 
labor determine the wage rate and total quantities of hours of work. 
The wage rate is thus given to an individual worker and he chooses 
between market activity and nonmarket activity based on this predeter-
mined wage rate, ceteris paribus. 
According to the theoretical considerations developed to this 
point, an individual would take as given the wage rate and would 
determine his equilibrium choice of hours of work, under ceteris 
paribus conditions. This development assumes that the demand for 
hours per week facing individuals is infinitely elastic at the given 
wage rate. This assumption is not completely unrealistic for low-
income workers. Doeringer has hypothesized that the ghetto labor 
market exhibits excess labor demand and he offers two pieces of evi-
dence to support his view: 
..• (1) the presence of 1ar.ge numbers of unfilled low-
skilled job vacancies frequently reported in or near 
central city areas, and (2) statements by ghetto workers 
that menial, less preferred employment is readily available, 
even to the casual job seeker.30 
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The idea of an infinitely elastic demand facing an individual is 
not inconsistent with the idea that workers are offered a fixed 
quantity wage-hour package associated with particular jobs. Each 
worker is faced with more than a single wage-hour package, and he 
should be able to select a combination that is consistent with his 
preferences. As Fleisher indicates, 
••• it is not at all obvious that because we can think 
of occupations where there is little opportunity to adjust 
employees' weekly hours of work that the workers found in 
such occupations have therefore been coerced into working 
the number of hours required ... Thus 'it would seem that 
employers would find it easier to hire workers who prefer 
the required length of the work week than workers who 
object to it.31 
Consistent with the idea of the infinitely elastic demand curve 
is the proposition that employers should be thought of as expressing 
their demands for labor in terms of total labor hours, not in terms 
of hours per week for each worker. 
As long as the wage rate is free to vary according to the forces 
of market demand and supply, workers will adjust their individual 
choices accordingly. Actually, wage rates tend to be "sticky" in a 
downward direction. To the extent that wages are inflexible, 
30 Peter Doeringer, "Manpower Programs for Ghetto Labor Markets," 
Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged, ed. Peter Doeringer (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J., 1969), p. 254. 
31Fleisher, pp. 60. 
38 
reductions in market demand will result in restrictions on the oppor-
tunities for working the desired number of hours. 
To the extent that imperfections in the market result in 
disequilibrium wage rates being given to the individual, changes in 
market demand will result in changes in employment opportunities. 
This means that individuals are unable to attain their equilibrium 
choices of hours of work where restrictions on opportunities exist. 
A limited inquiry into the opportunity to work question has been 
undertaken by James Morgan. He reports that, " ..... when we asked 
people whether they would like to work more hours a week more than a 
third said yes, and among the uneducated and uns~illed, more than half 
32 said that they would like more work." This result is suggestive of 
individuals being off their supply curve at points to the left of the 
curve. 
It is hypothesized that employment opportunities and the level 
of economic activity are directly related. The unemployment rate is 
typically used as a proxy for the level of economic activity; there-
fore, a negative relation is expected between hours of work and 
unemployment rates. 
In cross-sectional analysis on individual observation, the 
unemployment rate is a meaningful concept only as applied to some 
group or geographic area. An area market variable such as unemployment 
has meaning concerning individuals when interpreted as a measure of 
32 James N. Morgan, "The Supply of Effort, The Measurement of 
Well-Being, and t:he Dynamics of Improvement," American Economic 
Review, LVIII (May, 1968), p. 31. 
the probability that a person will be able to find work in the area 
during a given period of time. 33 This probability statement refers 
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not only to those individuals currently unemployed, but also to workers 
currently employed who might possibly change jobs or become multiple 
job holders. 
In addition to the metropolitan area unemployment rate, Bowen and 
Finegan al.so used an industry-mix variable and a measure of the average 
. bl 34 · wage varia e. The industry-mix variable reflects job opportunities 
for men while the market wage variable indicates what the expected 
pay-off would be for accepting employment in the area. Both variables 
are considered to be positively associated with the quantity of labor 
supplied. 
In their study of labor force participation, Cohen, Lerman and 
Rea use SMSA unemployment rates and percentage employment change in 
SMSA's as proxies for employment condition. 35 The unemployment rate 
is assumed to reflect labor market adjustments over. the long run. The 
inclusion of an employment change variable is justified on the grounds 
that the time path as well as the level of unemployment rates are 
relevant. 
33s . d Fi 76 ee Bowen an negan, p. . 
34 Bowen and Finegan, p. 75. 
35Malcolm S, Cohen, Robert I. Lerman ~nd Samuel A. Rea, Jr., "The 
Effects of Family Income and Area Employment Conditions on Labor Force 
Participation: A Micro Study." (A paper presented at the Winter 
Meetings of the Econometric Society, New York, December 30, 1969), 
p. 16. 
A constant unemployment rate over time produces a lower per-
centage of layoffs and a higher percentage of quits and new 
entrants than the same unemployment rate reached through a 
f~uctuating time path of unemployment rates. The percent-
age change in SMSA employment does not reveal the precise 
path by which a given SMSA unemployment rate was reached. 
However, given the unemployment rate in the SMSA, a high 
percentage increase by SMSA employment probably benefits 
new entrants more than those susceptible to employment 
through layoffs.36 
It should be noted that these proxies for demand conditions are 
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aggregate measures of economic activity for different geographic areas. 
It i.s assumed that individuals are aware of the opportunities that 
exist under different demand conditions. 
Limitations of Model 
Cross-Sectional Analysis 
A major question of concern when using cross-section data involves 
the validity of using results based on this type of data to predict 
changes which occur over time. Cain states: ·" the issue is one 
of how to use static relations from cross-sections to assess dynamic 
adjustments . 1137 
The cross-section technique used in this study yields estimates 
which combine labor force adjustments to both long-run differences in 
economic opportunity and social factors as well as short-run cyclical 
36 Ibid., p. 17. 
37Glen Cain, "Unemployment and Labor Force Participation of 
Secondary Workers," Industrial and Labor Relations, XX (January, 
196l)' p. 278. 
38 factors, The problem is stated succint.ly by Lester Taylor: 
Time serie.s variation is dominated by dynamic, intertempo-
ral factors that: are. absent from cross section. data. As a 
consequence, i.t is argued that time series estimates will 
largely. reflect short-run adjustment to changes in income 
and prices, while cross section estimates will tend to 
· reflect long-run adjustment. Of course it is possi.ble that 
not all households will be affected equally by cyclical 
and other time-varying factors, in whkh case cross section 
estimates will also reflect some short-run phenomena. The 
best available empirical evidence, however, indicates that 
the impact of time·varying factors on crou aection vari· 
ation is small relative to the. impact of factors peculiar 
to individual household•. Factors auch u family size, age 
of head of houaehold, race, education of head) etc., all 
vary from household to household' but very little from year 
to year. As a result, they will be reflected only to a 
small extent in t:l.me aeries variat:i.on. 
With particular reference to income elHticitiu, thue 
facts go a long way toward explaining why cross section 
estimates are usually substantially higher than time 
series esti.mates, since in terms of flows~ long-run coeffi· 
cients are always at least as large as short-run coeffi-
cients, 39 . 
41 
It is instructive to riote __ :the"· implications' of Becker Is theory. ~.Qr. 
cross-section elasticity estimation. Prices of various conunodities 
facing different families in a cross~sectional analys~s are assumed 
to be the same. Conunodi.t.y prices, however, would differ systematically 
if incomes differ because of differences in earnings. Foregone 
40 
earnings~ thus pri.ces, would be higher for the hig}ler income families. 
38 ., 
Joseph D, Mooney: "Urban· Poverty and Labor Force Participation: 
Reply,'' American Economic Review, LIX (March, 1969), p. 194. 
39L. D. Taylor~ "Combining Budget and Time Series Information. i.n 
Projecting Personal Consumption Expenditures," Memo, 1967, pp. 12-14, 
cited by Julian L. Simon and Dennis J, Aigner, "The Length-of-Run 
Nature of Cross-Sectional and Time Series Parameter Estimates," Social 
Systems Research Institute Workshop Series, SFM 6802 (University of 
Wiscorisin, 1968), pp. 3-4. 
40 Becker, p. 508. 
Becker states: 
The effect of income would be und~restimated for earnings-
intensive and overestimated for other connnodities, because 
the higher relative prices of the former would cause a sub-
stitution away from them and toward the latter. Accordingly, 
the income elasticities of demand for "leisure," unproduc-
tive, and time-intensive connnodities would be under-stated, 
and for "work," productive, and other goods-intensive com-
modities over-stated by cross-sectional estimates.41 
42 
Observed price elasticities should also be interpreted according 
to the importance of foregone earnings and the substitution between 
time and goods. Specifically, 
A given percentage increase in the price of goods would be 
less of an increase in connnodity prices the more important 
foregone earnings are. Consequently, even if all connnod-
ities had the same true price elasticity, those having rel-
atively important foregone earnings would show lower appar-
ent elasticities in the typical analysis that relates quan-
tities and prices of goods alone.42 
Thus it would not be representative to use the estimates of labor 
force sensitivity based on cross-section analysis to project short-run 
cyclical changes in labor force behavior. 43 
Other Limitations ---
It is expected that the multiple correlation coefficient associated 
with the model utilized in this study will be low. Cain states that 
"the low multiple correlations common to regressions with survey data 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., p. 515. 
43Edwin Kuh, "The Validity of Cross-Sectionally Estimated Behavior 
Equations in Time Series Applications," Econometrica, XXVII (April, 
1959), pp. 197-213. 
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may not be cause for alarm, but they do tell us that there are missing 
variables that could greatly add to the explanatory power of the 
relation. 1144 It is assumed that the excluded variables are uncorre-
lated with the variables included in the equation, but we cannot be 
sure. 
A general problem which is associated with all single equation 
models is that many variables that are treated as exogeneous· should be 
I 
treated as endogenous. In avoiding the use of simultaneous equations, 
a specific consequence is the necessary use of the concept of income 
from nonemployment ·sources to capture the "income effect." 
It is also assumed that the productivities of husbands in non-
market activity are either unvarying or uncorrelated to the included 
explanatory variables. Unless the number of children can be accepted 
as a proxy for the home productivity of the wife, a similar assumption 
is necessary for her as well. 
In spite of the limitations indicated, it is felt that valuable 
information can be obtained with the use of this model. Specific 
limiations and insights will be indicated as the analysis proceeds. 
Data editing proce.dures, specification of selected regression equations, 




DATA AND METHODS 
Included in this chapter are modifications of the general model 
presented in Chapter II, applied to selected groups of individuals, and 
using terms avqilable in the data. The chapter format is to discuss 
first the original data source and the editing procedures used in fil-
tering this data into the desired data-bank. Next, selected groups are 
filtered from the data-bank and regression equations are specified for 
these groups. This is followed by a detailed discussion of the various 
measures available in the data-bank, resulting in a selection of the 
measures to be incorporated into the ~nalysis. 
Des~ription of Data 
The 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity (SEO) serves as the basic 
1 data source for this study. The Bureau of the Census conducted this 
survey for the Office of Economic Opportunity during the Spring of 1967 
to obtain more detailed information about poverty than normally avail- . 
able from Current Population Survey (CPS) questions. The SEO sample 
of approximately 30,000 households is composed of two parts: (l) A 
1 Subsequent to the diStribution of the SEO data in September, 1969, 
a number of inconsistencies in the data were discovered both by the 
data users and by the ASSIST Corporation. The ASSIST Corporation. 
handled a large portion of the original SEO data editing for the Office 
of Economic Opportunity. Transaction tapes provided by the ASSIST 
Corporation were obtained and the data corrected. · 
44 
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national self-weighing sample of approximately 18,000 households, 
selected in the same manner as the CPS sample; and (2) A supplementary 
sample of 12,000 households drawn from areas with a large concentration 
of nonwhites. 
The reason for the second part of the SEO sample was to increase 
the reliability of estimates for the poverty population. 
The supplementatiQn has the effect of increasing the reli-
ability of estimates of the characteristics of about 17 
million persons, over 2/3 of whom are nonwhite. However, 
it does not materially improve the national estimates for 
whites beyond what would have been obtained from the E-1, 
[part (l)], sample only.2 
Data Editing 
This study utilizes specified groups from an edited version of the 
SEO data. This edited version of the SEO data will hereafter be re-
ferred to as the data-bank. The editing procedure involved a sequential 
filtering process in which an interview unit record3 was eliminated if 
one (or more) of the following factors was identified in that record: 
1. SEO addresses where interviews were not taken. 
2. Households containing interview units on farms or self-
employed, because of the difficulties associated with imputing 
values for wage rates. 
3. Interview units with gross earned and unearned incomes above 
the low-cost poverty level as defined by the Social Security 
Administration (SSA). 
211 1966 and 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity Sample Design and 
Weighting," Office of Economic Opportunity, p. 7. 
3An interview unit may be either a family or an .. individual. 
46 
4. Interview units with heads in the military, since neither 
an accurate hours nor a money wage measure can b~ imputed. 
The data-bank is thus· composed of civilian, nonfarm, low-income inter-
view units whose head was a wage earner. 
These reasons, in the order incorporated into the iterative editing 
procedure, with the number of cases filtered out at each step, are 
summarized in Table 1. 
TABLE I 
EDITING PROCEDURE USED TO 
OBTAIN DATA-BANK 
Reason for Deletion Number of Cases Deleted 
Not interviewed* . . . . . .• 11,570 
Farm*. • , • • . . . . . , . . .• 1,662 
Interview unit above SSA Low-Cost Income Threshold .• 18,018 
Interview-unit head in military ..•• 62 
Self-employed head of interview unit 436 
Resulting sample size (Interview units) •• 7,130 
*Refers to households, which may contain more than one interview unit; 
thus, aggregation problems exist if one attempts to sum the number 
of cases deleted. 
It should be noted that the poverty status previously mentioned is 
the SSA low-cost level rather than the more familiar poverty (economy) 
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leveL The matr:tx of low-cost threshold income levels for nonfarm 
families headed either by a male or female with different family com-
position and size are shown in Table II for those readers who are un-
familiar with this concept, The low-cost threshold income figure 
included in the SEO data differs from that shown in the table for a 
given set of family characteristics. The OEO modified the values in 
the table to correct for an error in the price index used. The·new 
values are.97,7 per cent of the values presented in Table II. The 
more restrictive SSA poverty index will be introduced in defining 
specific groups for analytic purposes. 
Groupings Designated for Initial 
Estimating Procedures 
The primary focus of this study is on those family units who 
satisfy the eligibility criteria of the proposed Family Assistance Plan 
(FAP); however, other selected low-income groups are identified for 
comparative purposes, Th~ purpose of this section is to discuss the 
editing procedure used in the section of specific groups from the 
data bank and to discuss the respective regression equations to be 
estimated for given groups, The statistical procedure used in the 
analysis of the data is also explored. 
The Primary Family Assistant Plan Group 
FAP is basically designed to assist low-income families with 
children under 18 years of age or 18 to 21 years of age and in school, 
including families with male heads and families where the head is 
TABLE II 
NONFARM.LCM-~OST THRESHOLD INCOME LEVELS DEVELOPED BY 
THE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 1966* 
Number of related children under age 18 
18-21 years of age and in school 
Family 
Size 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Male Head 
1 Under Age 65**· 2138 
65 or Over. . 1926 
2 Under Age 65**· . 2969 3158 
65 or Over. . 2676 3158 
3 • 3384 3469 3554 
4 4417 4467 4315 4400 
5 . . . • 5296 5348 5161 5026 5059 
6 6025 6092 5923 5804 5635 5618 
7 or More .. • 7581 7648 7479 7344 7174 6887 
Female Head 
1 Under Age 65**· 1973 
65 or Over. ... . 1880 
2 Under Age 65**. 2740 2865 
65 or Over. • 2611 2865 
3 3282 3367 3351 
4 4264 4332 4298 4197 
5 . 5095 5178 5128 5043 4856 
6 . 5889 5940 5889 5787 .· 5618 5432 






SOURCE: 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity Codebook published by the 
Office of Economic Opportunity. 
NOTES: * -- 1964 Nonfarm Criteria raised by 8.5 per cent to allow 
for increase in per-capita cost of low-cost food plan 
between January 1964 and December 1966, 
** -- Refers to age of family head. 
4 working. 
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FAP editing procedure. The data-bank contains records for inter-
view units below both the SSA poverty and low-cost levels. Interview 
units whose income levels fall below the low-cost threshold, but not 
below the poverty (economy) level are designated "near-poor." Only 
interview units whose income levels are below the poverty-income 
threshold are desired for the FAP sample. The poverty threshold income 
levels are shown in Table III. 
Also deleted are interview units without children. The FAP sample 
consists only of families who have children below 18 years of age or 
18 to 21 years of age and in school. Since the lB~to-21-year-olds 
attending school were not coded as children in the SEO data, a filtering 
procedure was used to identify fam~lies with children, including these 
18-to~21-year-olds, who were considered as near•poo~ using the SSA 
indices. The revisep definitiqn oi' children resulted in transferring 
12 family records from the near-poor to the poor classification. 
Since both employed and unemployed individuals are found in the 
data, the sample was further restricted to only families who had a 
working family head. This is not a FAP requirement, but rather a 
restriction based on the hours measure selected for analysis. The 
family head was considered a "working" family head if he reported hours 
worked during the week prior to the survey and reported weeks worked 
during 1966. In families where both the husband and wife were present, 
4alen C. Cain and Le·onard J. Hausman, "The Family Assistance Plan: 
An Analysis and Evaluation," A policy statement of the National Man-
power Policy Task Force Associate.s (Washington, D. C., April 17 1 1970), 
pp. 2-3. 
TABLE III 
NONFARM POVERTY (ECONOMY) THRESHOLD INCOME LEVELS 
DEVELOPED BY THE SOCIAL SECURI'IY 
ADMINISTRATION, 1966* 
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Source: 1967 Survey of Economic Opportunity Codebook published by the 
Office of Economic Opportunity. 
Notes: * -- 1964 nonfarm criteria raised by 6.5 per cent to allow 
for increase in per capita cost of economy food plan 
between January 1964 and December 1966. 
** -- Refers to age of family head. 
51 
the husband is always designated family head. 
These editing procedures are illustrated in Table IV by showing 
the number of families omitted for each of the above reasons. The 
reasons for deletion.are listed in the order performed since a sequen~ 
tial filtering process was incorporated. 
TABLE IV 
EDITING PROCEDURE USED TO SELECT THE SAMPLE 
OF WORKING POOR WITH CHILDREN 
(FAP) 
Reasons for deletion Number of Interview ll'nits Oeleted 
Number of interview units in 
data-bank 7,130 
Interview unit income was greater 
than poverty threshold. , . . 1,893 
Interview unit had no children. . .2,738 
Interview unit head was not working , 1,288 
Total deletions 5,929 
FAP sample size 1,211 
It is important to recognize that this sample encompasses only 
the working or employed portion of the families qualified under FAP. 
A sample completely conforming to the FAP eligibility criteria would 
include the 2,499 records remaining after only the first two steps of 
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the editing process. The 1,211 families remaining after all three 
editing stages will be referred toas the FAP sample. 
Specification of !!!_ initial FAP relation. The hours of work 
equation for the FAP group can now be specified using variables dis-
cussed in detail later in this chapter. 
Equation (1) is read to show a relation between the number of hours 
supplied by family heads (L), and own wage rate (W), family income 
from nonearnings sources (V), indebtedness of the family (D), the 
level of assets net of liabilities possessed by the family (NA), the 
number of children in the family (C), and own classification with re-
spect to each of the dummy variables: working wife 
(0 ), health limitation on amount of work performed 
m 
(0 ) , married 
w 
(Oh)' black (Orb), 
female family head (0 ), less than twenty-five years of age (0 ), 
SX ag1 
more than fifty-four years of age (0 ), less than twelve years of 
ag3 
education (0 d ), more than twelve years of education (0 d ), (a) 
e 1 e 3 
is a constant and (e) is a random disturbance term with an assumed 
mean of zero and a constant but unknown variance. 
The existence of intercorrelation among these variables will be 
explored. As stated by Melichar, 
A very useful aspect of the regression technique is 
that the analyst can explore the effects of intercorrela-
tions among the factors by experimenting with equations 
containing different combinations of factors. By observing 
the amount and direction of change in the coefficients ob-
tained for a given factor as other factors are in turn 
added to or deleted from the regression equation, one can 
ascertain which intercorrelations masked the underlying 
relationship between the dependent variable and the factor 
being studied.5 
This technique will be followed for each of the regression equations; 
however, the variables and sequencing of deletion will be determined 
on an~ priori basis. 
Interactions between selected variables will be analyzed by 
introducing interaction terms directly into selected equations to be 
estimated. 
The "Poor" Wi that.it Children 
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A second sample drawn from the data-bank consists of the working 
poor without children. These families differ from the FAP group only 
in the absence of children under 18, or 18 to 21 and in school. Unre-
lated individuals are included. 
Cain and Hausman have shown the desirability of extending FAP 
coverage to include these poor families without children. They state: 
The inclusion of families without children and of 
unrelated individuals would, of course, enhance the goal 
of reducing poverty. The costs of such an extension of 
coverage is estimated to be about $1% billion. A large por-
tion of these benefits would supplement incomes of deserted, 
divorced, and single women, and much of the remainder would 
go to young couples, most of whom will eventually become 
5Emanuel Melichar, "Least-Squares Analysis of Economic Survey 
Data," Journal of the American Statistical Association (1965 Proceedings 
of the Business~nd Economic Statistics Section), p. 382. 
parents. One benefit from this expansion is that the '~aby 
bonus" feature of the existing bill is removed. Childless 
couples would have no special incentive to alter their plans 
regarding child-bearing .and it would be less likely that 
children would be transferred from their natural home to 
that of a childless relative to qualify the latter unit for 
FAP benefits. Both types of induced behavior are undesir-
able and would not arise if coverage were universal. 6 
Consideration of such an extension in coverage warrants a separate 
analysis of this group. 
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Editing procedure. Only interview units whose income levels fall 
below the poverty threshold, who have no children, and who were working 
family heads were selected for this sample. These editing criteria 
and the number of cases deleted at each stage are tabulated in Table V. 
TABLE V 
EDITING PROCEDURE USED TO SELECT THE SAMPLE 
. OF WORKING POOR WITHOUT CHILDREN 
(WPWC) 
Reasons for deletion of 
interview unit records 
Number of interview 
units deleted 
Number of interview units in data-bank 7,130 
Interview unit income was above poverty threshold 1,893 
Interview unit had children 2,499 
Interview unit head was not working 2 ,324 
Total deletions 
Sample size 414 
6cai.n and Hausman, p. 3. 
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This sample will hereafter be referred to as the working poor without 
children (WP-WC) sample. 
Specification of the WP-WC equations. Specific differences 
associated with the regression equations estimated for this sample 
include: (1) the exclusion of number of children (C) as an explana-
tory variable, and (2) the inclusion of a dummy var:i,able OF having a 
value of 1 if the interview unit is an unrelated individual, and 0 
otherwise. 
The official count of poor households is based on annual income, 
where families and unrelated individuals are considered poor if their 
income is less than the specified poverty index. The Social Security 
Administration's index of poverty, illustrated in Table III, is a 
minimum or threshold income per household of a given size, composition, 
and nonfarm status. The index is based on the estimated minimal cost 
of a nutritionally adequate diet for individuals. More specifically, 
In 1966 the Agriculture Department eco'nomy food plan, 
which is the core of the poverty index, provided for total 
food expenditures of only 75 cents a day per person (in 
an average four-person family). The index adds only twice 
this amount to cover all family items other than food ••. 
The measure of near poverty--about one third higher in 
cost--centers about the low-cost food plan.7 
Although such an index is desirable in implementing policy, the 
specific threshold income levels are somewhat arbitrary. This point 
is emphasized by Tobin, 
7Mollie Orshansky, "The Shape of Poverty in 1966," Social 
Security Bulletin (March, 1968), p. 5. 
Neither of these aggregate measures, the count or the gap, 
awards any points for increasing the incomes of the near-poor, 
those households falling, say, between one and one and a half 
times the poverty line. The line is, after all, arbitrary and 
minimal, and it would be a hollow victory over poverty just to 
move all the poor a few inches beyond it. Some income supple-
mentation proposals spill benefits on the near-poor. Quite 
apart from the fact that this spillover may be necessary for 
reasons of incentive, equity, and continuity, the near~poor 
should not be considered undeserving beneficiaries.8 
This statement provides ample justification for the inclusion of a 
sample of the "near-poor" into this analysis. 
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Editing procedure. This sample consists of interview units whose 
income levels are greater than the poverty threshold income levels but 
less than the low-cost levels. Only interview units with reported 
work records were included in the sample. Listed in Table VI are the 
number of cases deleted for each reason. This sample will be referred 
to as the working near-poor (WNP). 
Specification of the WNP equations. The WNP sample may be split 
into two components: interview-units (families) with children (WNP-C) 
and interview units without _children (WNP-WC). This division allows 
the regression equations specified for FAP and WP-WC samples to be 
applied to the WNP-C and WNP-WC samples respectively. This separation 
should also facilitate comparative analysis. The sample size for 
WNP-C and WNP-WC is 701 and 201 respectively. 
The samples defined in the preceding sections included: the 
working poor families with children (FAP, N = 1211), the working poor 
families and unrelated individuals without children (WP-WC, N = 414), 
the working near-poor families with children (WNP-C, N = 701), and 
8 James Tobin, "Raising the Incomes of the Poor," Agenda :for 
the Natioa." 1969-, R· ,85 .. 
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the working near-poor families and unrelated individuals without chil-
dren (WNP-WC, N z 201). 
TABLE VI 
EDITING PROCEDURE USED TO SELECT THE 
SAMPLE OF WORKING NEAR-POOR 
(WNP) 
Reasons for deletion of Number of 
interview unit records cases deleted 
Number of interview units in data-bank 7,130 
Interview unit income was below poverty threshold 5,237 







This section presents a detailed discussion of the available 
measures used in estimating the model specified in Chapter II. When 
more than one option is available for a given variable, the discussion 
clarifies why the chosen version was selected. 
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Hours Worked 
It will be recalled from the discussion of hours of work in Chapter 
II that the information desired is a measure of the equilibrium number 
of hours individuals in low-income families would be willing to offer 
per unit of time at alternative price (wage) levels, ceteris paribus. 
Information is available in the data-bank on two dimensions of the 
hours worked component of the quantity of labor actually supplied to 
the market at various wage levels: hours worked per week (H), and 
weeks worked per year (K). The weekly houts of work measure is the 
number of hours worked during the week prior to the survey, while 
information on the number of weeks worked, either full-time or part-
time, is based on the previous year (1966). This information, as well 
as other data secured by the SEO, was obtained from any member of the 
interview unit, 18 years of age or older, who knew enough about the 
activities of the other members to report for them, 
The interview data on hours worked is intended to measure the 
number of hours actually spent at market activity by the individual 
during the week preceding the survey. Individuals' concepts of work-
ing time differ, however, and these differences may not be random in 
nature. T. A. Finegan states: 
Hourly rated workers (or those replying for them seem 
likely to report the number of hours for which payment was 
received, while salaried employees probably make a rough 
estimate of their work week based on the time spent in the 
office or away from home. ·Both groups are likely to over-
state their "actual'' hours--the former to the extent that 
hours paid but not worked are included, the latter to the 
extent that full deduction for leisure time in the office 
or away from home is not made.9 
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The consideration concerning salaried employees is probably not relevant 
to the low-income group. 
The bias in reported hours worked by hourly rated workers may be 
somewhat offset by the tendency for individuals to report standard or 
regular hours rather than hours actually worked. Victor R. Fuchs has 
found, ba~ed on empirical analysis, that average hours for groups of 
individuals may not be affected since persons' actual hours will deviate 
10 
both positively and negatively from reported hours. 
The use of weeks worked per year as an alternative measure of 
labor supplied by individuals was considered. This information was 
obtained by the SEO by asking individuals how many weeks during the 
past year they worked, either full-time or part-time, not counting 
work around the house. It is evident that identical responses may re-
sult from different actual amounts of time worked since part-time work 
in terms of hours is included. But, even if corrections could be made 
so that the weekly measure was a full-time equivalent, the measure may 
still not be the most appropriate selection. Fuchs has evidence based 
on the 1/1,000 sample of the 1960 U. S. Census that,· 
if there were no correlation between hours and weeks worked 
across individuals, weeks worked would give a good indica-
tion of time spent at work. However .•. there is a clear 
tendency for persons working many weeks per year to work 
long hours per week also. Therefore, if we know that one 
9T. A. Finegan, '~ours of Work in the United States: A Cross-
Sectional Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, 70 (October, 1962), 
p. 468. 
lOVictor R. Fuchs, The Service Economy (New York, 1968), p. 226. 
person worked more weeks than another, we would expect that 
he worked more man-hours per year by a greater relative 
amount than indicated by the relative number of weeks worked. 
Information on hours, therefore, adds to our knowledge of 
differences among groups in time spent at work .•. 11 
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As discussed earlier, cross-section data are usually interpreted 
as measuring long-run tendencies. For this reason,· annual hours worked 
by individuals may be a more appropriate measure of the quantity of 
labor supplied. Hours worked per year (L) by an individual are·equal 
to the product of the number of hours worked during the week preceding 
the survey and the number of weeks worked during the previous year 
(1966), or L =HK. Hours of work are reported in continuous form, 
while weeks of work are grouped into class intervals. The relevant 
interval median was multiplied by the number of hours worked in the 
week prior to the survey to obtain annual hours worked. 
Using hours worked for one week to estimate total hours worked 
for the previous year assumes, of course, that the reported hours 
worked in the week preceding the survey is the same as the average 
number of hours worked in each of the weeks wOO!iked in the previous 
year. 12 On the other hand, if (H) measures the normal hours worked 
per week, then (H) might be considered an average number of hours 
worked per week for the previous year. This would mean that (L) would 
more.accurately reflect total annual hours of work. 
The value for hours worked per year may vary foD some groups of 
individuals, depending upon the time of year when the survey is 
11 Fuchs, p. 226. 
12The work now in progress by C. Russell Hill, University of 
Michigan, has provided insights into the shortcomings of the measures 
of hours worked. 
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conducted. Seasonal workers, for example, may work full-time part 
of the year and less than full-time, or not at all, during the off-
season. 
Variations in hours worked per year by individuals due to part-
time work may result because the work is part-time in terms of hours 
worked per week, part-time in terms of weeks worked per year, or 
part-time due to both factors. Tests will be conducted for differences 
in the variation of hours worked due to the various types of part-time 
work. Dummy variapies will be used to classify workers as to part-
time or full-time status for both hours worked during the w~bk preced-
ing the survey and for the weeks worked during 1966. 
Earnings rates 
Several measures of earnings rates (W) are available in the SEO 
data. Each measure will be discussed in an attempt to show the one 
that is thought to be most appropriate for this analysis. 
A wage earner's effective wage rate may be computed from the data 
on the week preceding the survey by dividing total w~ekly earnings 
before deductions (E ) by the number of hours (H) worked during the 
w 
week. It is assumed that the calculated wage rate is the normal wage 
rate that prevailed during 1966. To the extent that an individual is 
a multiple job holder, has changed jobs during or since 1966, or has 
worked overtime during the reference week, this measure for the indi-
vidual's wage rate will be biased. 
Information is not available from the data concerning the number 
of individuals w;ho were multiple- job-holders during 1966. Of the 
family heads in the FAP sample, 71 per cent worked during the week 
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prior to the survey at jobs which were identical to the job longest 
hdd during 1966. 13 Such a large percentage indicates that the wage 
rate is probably not biased due only to job changes by individuals that 
may have occurred in 1966. Approximately 23 per cent (282) of family 
heads indicated that they worked more than 40 hours during the week 
prior to the survey. This result suggests a biased measure for the 
wage rate to the extent that those who worked more than 40 hours per 
week were paid overtime rates. One would expect, for low-income 
workers, that only a fraction received increased rates of pay; thus, 
the measure may not be seriously biased. 
The second method for estimating an individual's wage rate is to 
divide gross annual earnings (E ) by total hours worked during the y . 
year (L). This measure, as in the previous case, results in an average 
wage rate for ~he given time period; one that has the same limitations 
as the previously mentioned wage rate. 
Koster calls attention to one shortcoming of using either of the 
above measures. 
Random or transitory variation in hours or weeks of work 
is likely to introduce spurious negative correlation since 
the wage rate is computed by dividing earnings by their pro-
duct. Consequently, there will be a tendency toward negative 
bias for a coefficient estimated in a regression of H or [L] 
on [W] .14 
13All tests and data counts in this chapter were based on the 
FAP sample unless otherwise indicated. 
14Marvin Ko~tep, "Income and Substitution Parameters in a Family 
Labor Supply Model" (P-3339, The RAND Corporation, Decemher, 1966), 
p. 60. . . 
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In his study of hours of work, T. A. Finegan found that the 
spurious correlation between mean hours worked by male wage-and-salary 
workers during the Census Week, 1950, and median hourly income for 
th 1949 . 1. . bl f . . d · 15 H e year, , is neg igi e among manu acturing in ustries. e 
consequently suggested that such a spurious negative correlation m~y 
not be important in other non-manufacturing groups in cross-section 
analyses. 
It is suggested that, of the two measures discussed, the wage 
rate based on weekly data for the week prior to the survey is most 
likely to minimize the chances of having spurious correlation with the 
dependent variable (annual hours worked). This is so because it is 
expected that individuals more accurately remember events and facts 
pertaining to more recent time periods and thus report the information 
more accurately. 
A simple correlation coefficient was computed for the two alterna-
tive measures to test whether the selection of one or the other would 
be expected to make much difference in estimating the model. The 
coefficient had a value of .43, which suggests that some difference 
in the wage coefficient may result in estimating the model, depending 
on which measure is selected. Approximately the same correlation 
coefficient was obtained (.44) when the FAP sample was restricted to 
include only full-time workers. The low correlation between the two 
wage rates may have resulted from the measurement of the weeks com-
ponent of total hours worked per year, where hours per year was the 
15T. A. Finegan, "Hours of Work in the United States: A Cross-
sectional Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, LXX (October, 
1962), pp. 469-470. 
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denominator in the wage rate based on yearly data. Weeks worked was 
not a continuous variable, rather it was restricted to selected inter-
vals in the SEO data. The median value for each interval was used to 
estimate hours worked per year. 
Two additional measures of individual earnings rates ~re avail-
able in the SEO data: earnings for the reference week in 1967 and for 
the year, 1966. Both are thought to be relatively less attractive 
for present purposes than those already considered. Since it has been 
shown that persons who work more weeks per year tend also to work more 
hours per week, "information on hours, therefore, adds to our knowledge 
of differences among groups in time spent at work, and hence improves 
16 
our estimate of earnings per unit of time worked. Thus the more 
direct measure of hourly earnings is preferable. 
Kosters considered the use of the logarithm of total annual earn-
ings as the dependent variable to avoid introducing errors in (H) or 
(K) into the dependent variable. 17 ije shows that this measure is also 
undesirable since 
Variation across individuals with a given wage rate in hours 
of work per year and consequently in earnings introduces 
positive correlation which is especially important ~hen in-
dividuals are used as observations in the regression, Hence, 
a positive relationship between hours of work and earnings is 
likely to appear even if the relationship between hours of 
work and the wage rate is negative.18 
The earnings rate variable (W) used in this study will be the 
hourly wage rate calculated from hours and earnings data for the 
16 
Fuchs, p. 226-227. 
17 
Kosters, p. 61. 
18 Ibid. 
65 
reference week. This rate, as well as the ones previously discussed, 
is a gross rate since no adjustments are made for taxes or other ex-
penses of work, 
The wage rate for the wife in families where both the husband and 
wife are working is not included directly in the regression equation. 
Instead, a dummy variable (0 ) is introduced to indicate whether or 
w 
not the wife was working. The variable (Z), discussed later in this 
chapter, should provide an adequate control for the wife's wage rate. 
It was thought that perhaps the variability in the wife's wage rate 
would be sufficiently small so that its effect in the regression 
analysis would be basically that of a constant. Such was not the case. 
This variable had a mean of 1.08 dollars per hour (based on data from 
the reference week) and standard deviation of 57 cents in the FAP 
sample. It should be noted that of the 1,211 in the FAP sample, 722 
were families composed of married heads, and of that number only 185 
had working wives. 
Income Other Than Earnings 
Nonearnings income (V) is the summation of all wealth and transfer 
payment income. The various measures of (V) in the SEO data represent 
estimated total amounts received during the twelve months of 1966. 
Income from rents, dividends, and interest composes wealth income 
(Vw). Transfer payment income (VT) includes the following: 
1. social security or railroad retirement 
2. government pensions 
3. veterans, pensions or compensation 
4. pensions from private employers 
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5. workmen's compensation, illness, or accident benefits 
6. unemployment insurance benefits 
7. public assistance, relief, or welfare from state or local 
governments~ (aid to families with dependent children; 
aid to the blind or totally disabled; or old age assistance) 
8. other types of regular.· income such as payments from annui-
ties, royalties, private welfare or relief, contributions 
from persons not living in the household, and alimony or 
armed forces allotments. Lump-sum (once and for all) 
settlements or payments are excluded. 
The distribution of nonearnings income among these components and 
the frequency of receipt for each component is illustrated in Table 
VII. 
Almost half (507) of the families in the FAP group received some 
f f . . 19 orm o nonearnings income. Only 18 per cent of nonearnings income 
(V) occurrences were in the form of wealth income (Vw), while 82 per 
cent were in the form of transfer income (Vt). Wealth income was 
relatively more important for the near-poor groups where (Vw) accounted 
for approximately 30 per cent of the total number of occurrences of V. 
The mean value for (V) was 653 dollars. 
Wealth income (Vw) was nil in the FAP sample, both in terms 
of relative number of occurrences and total dollars received; the 
percentages being 17 per cent and 1 per cent respectively. Such was 
not the case for the near-poor where the comparable figures were 
19The totals for V, Vt, and Vw do not represent families since a 
family may have had nonearnings income from more than one source. 
Item 
Total nonearnings income (v) 











7-Public Asst. and Welfare 
8-0th.er Earnings 
TABLE VII 
INCOME FROM.SOURCES OTHER THAN EARNINGS 
BY INCOME TYPE, 1966 - FAP CROUP 
Number of Per cent of total Per cent of total Mean dollars Standard 
occurrences occurrences dollars received received* deviation 
507 .. lOO·. (}£)___ 100.00 653.12 976.45 
91 17.95 1.04 37.91 369.94 
22 4.34 -0.02 -2.91 749 .24 
63 12.43 1.00 52~44 87.62 
6 1.18 0.06 35.00 21.34 
416 82.05 98 .96 787 .69 1059.55 
·73 14.40 17.84 809.18 1049.70 
5 0.99 1.83 1212.00 495 .13 
16 3.16 3.17 655.94 498.05 
0 0.0 o.o 0.0 0.0 
29 5. 72 2.67 305.41 352.92 
43 8.48 5.70 438.74 550.38 
168 33.14 49.03 966 .48 1265. 72 
82 16.17 18 .71 755.66 1030.16 
*Means were calculated on the basis of the number of occurrences in each category of nonearnings income. 
°' '..! 
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approximately 30 per cent and 8 per cent respectively. The mean value 
of 37 dollars for the FAP sample was about a fourth that of the near-
poor groups. Interest made the 111ost important positive contribution 
to wealth income for the poor groups, while rent was negative in its 
"b . 20 A contri ution. lthough interest income was important in terms of 
frequency of occurrence, having a mean value of over SO dollars for the 
near-poor, rent was a more important component in terms of percentage 
-of total (V) dollars received. 
The mean value for (Vt) of ·1st:·'61Fwas about 100 dollars less than 
for the near-poor group. Public assistance and welfare, social secu~ 
rity, and "other income" were the nonearnings incomes most frequently 
received by the FAP group, totaling over 60 per cent of all (V). These 
categories accounted for over 85 per cent of all nonearnings income. 
"Public assistance and welfare" was the most significant of the three 
categories both in frequency of occurrence, 33 per cent, and in per-
centage of total (V) received, 49 per(.cent, having a mean value of 
1,265 dollars. Except for the working near-poor without children, 
public assistance and welfare had about the same compositional nature 
among the selected groups; however, the mean is significantly smaller 
(less than 350 dollars) for the poor without children. Social security 
20Interest is defi~ed as money received by a person for the use 
of money. Interest accruing but not actually received is also con-
sidered as "interest." Rent is a net concept, calculated by subtracting 
from gross rent all the cost incurred by the owner in connection with 
the property. Cost includes such items as depreciation, taxes, repairs, 
maintenance, insurance and interest on mortgages. The cost of any per-
manent improvements are excluded. 
Also considered as rent is the net income from roomers and 
boarders, where expenses include such items as co~t of food and general 
upkeep of facilities. 
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is approximately equal in relative importance between the poor and 
near-poor samples with children, having a slightly smaller mean value 
for the near-poor group. This type of income is much more important 
for the poor and near~poor families without children with the frequency 
of occurrence being approximately 45 per cent anq accounting for 
approximately 70 per cent of all (V) received with a mean value in the 
400 dollar range for both groups. 
·The "other income" category is relatively less important for groups 
other than FAP both in terms of frequency of income occurrence by type 
and percentage of total (V). 
The measures of dispersion shown for each of the components of 
(V ) and (V ) indicate the large variability within each class of 
t w 
income. Furthermore, these dispersion measures suggest that various 
categories of nonearnings income have skewed distributions since the 
components of (V ) and (V ) are restricted to positive values with 
t w 
the exception of rent. 
Shortcomings of ~ nonearnings income variable. Several problems 
are associated with adopting (V) as the income variable. Measurement 
error in the nonearnings income variable may result as a consequence 
of underreporting or misreporting. Martin David found that "there is 
an underreporting of income from assistance in the population studied 
which runs to one•fifth of the total benefits paid out by the welfare 
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21 
agency. " Th:j..s type of measurement error would bias the income co-
efficient toward zero. 
Another problem involves the appropriateness of nonearnings income 
. . bl 22 as an income varia e. Nonearnings income can accrue to a family 
in the form of wealth income or transfer income. Since wealth income 
may be received in a nonsystematic manner, its effect on work effort 
would be much the same as would be expected for the receipt of any 
transitory income. This proble~ may not be cause f-0r concern in this 
study because of the limited amounts and number of occurrences associ-
ated with (V) and its components. 
w 
Wealth income (V ) may, however, result from a return on gross 
w 
assets. In such a case, (V) would be positively correlated with the 
w 
level of assets. Such a correlation would introduce collinearity 
problems since either gross or n~t .assets are included as an explora-
tory variable in selected regressions. Simple correlation analysis 
between (V ) and both (NA) and (A) failed to provide strong support 
w 
for the hypothesized relationship, especially for the FAP sample. The 
correlation coefficient for the association between (V ) and (A) was 
w 
0.26, while that between (V ) and (NA) was 0.45. 
w 
21Martin David, "The Validity of Income Reported by a Sample of 
Families Who Received Welfare Assistance During 1959," American Statis-
tical Association Journal, LVII (September, 1962), p. 685. Also see 
Michael E. Barus, "Response Error and Questioning Technique in Surveys 
of Earnings Information," American Statistical Association Journal, LXI 
(September, 1966), pp 729-738. The latter study deals with income from 
earnings rather than nonearnings income; thus, the finding that the 
small average response error incorporated rather large offsetting posi-
tive and negative errors is applicable to the wage rate measure used in 
the study since earnings income is found in the numerator of that 
measure. 
22 Kosters, pp. 17'-18. 
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The receipt of some transfer income, on the other hand, is con-
tingent on institutional eligibility criteria. Money payments provided 
through such programs as unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation, 
and, to a lesser degree, social security depend upon evidence of not 
working. If nonearnings income is largely compd,sed of these types of 
transfers, then (V) may be negatively correlated with (H) due to the 
institutional constraints rather than due to any "pure income effect." 
This problem is perhaps least significant for the FAP group since the 
work constraining transfers mentioned above are least prominent for 
the FAP group. 
It is argued that nonemployment income from income transfers is 
an acceptable measure of an income effect. Other things being equal, 
identical family units which might qualify for benefits under these 
programs would receive different levels of money payments according 
to their geographic location (state or local area). Thus, consider-
able variation in (V) would be expected independent of work constraints 
which would allow for an estimate of the income effect. 
Stubblebine argues that a pure income effect must be associated 
with lump-sum receipts. Transfer payments cannot be considered as 
truly lump-sum since their distribution depends on past or current 
f . . . 23 per ormance or some income criteria. If the variation in transfer 
income was due to differing benefit levels between states, the problem 
23william Graig Stubblebine, "Alternative Direct Wage Subsidy 
Plans to Increase Recipient Income Levels and an Adequate Income 
Guarantee At Acceptable Cost: Comment" (paper prepared for the 
1969 Western Economic Association Meetings, Long Beach, California, 
August 21-22, 1969), p. 2. 
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mentioned by Stubblebine may be partially overcome. Lack of information 
identifying the family's place of residence prevents a separation of 
the variation due to interstate differences from that due to other 
inter-personal differences. 
Another income variable will be incorporated into the analysis 
in selected regressions as a basis of comparison in case of difficulties 
associated with (Vt). This alternative variable (Z) will equal total 
family income minus the earnings of the head. 24 To the extent that 
(Z) is primarily composed of various forms of (V), the same comments 
made concerning (V) or (Vt) would be appli~able. (Z) should be a more 
reliably reported measure and should represent a significantly larger 
portion of family income for the families with multiple wage earners. 25 
Tastes 
The taste variables are classified into three groups: (1) taste 
for money income; (2) t~ste for market work£!:!_~; and (3) taste for 
nonmarket work. 
Taste for money income. The theoretical basis for these variables 
was provided in Chapter II. The extent of indebtedness and the level 
of net assets or net worth were the variables considered. 
The total debt (D) for a family is enumerated in the SEO data and 
includes the followipg components: 
1. debts on the home 
2. debts on real estate 
24 See Kosters, p. 8. 
25 Ibid. 
3. debts on car and/or truck 
4. debts to food and clothing stores, utility, fuel, and gas 
companies 
5. debts to doctors, den.tis ts, hospitals, or for other medical 
care 
6. debts to banks or other financial institutions (aside from 
above debts) 
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7. debts to other persons, not including members of household 
The value for (D) was given in the data as well as the values for its 
components. 
Data on total assets (A), and its components, are also available 
from the SEO. The components of (A) include: 
1. value of the home 
2. value of rea1 estate 
3, money in checking or savings accounts or elsewhere 
4. face value of owned govenment bonds 
5. value of owned stocks 
6. loans made to others 
7. value of owned cars and/or trucks 
8. value of other owned assets, such as oil royalties, patents, 
commodity contracts, boats and trailers. (Excluded are 
personal belongings and furniture.) 
The value of assets, except where noted, is estimated current market 
value at the time the survey was conducted, not the actual purchase 
value. 
The net asset position (NA) of a family is equal to total assets 
(A) minus J:otal debt,s (D). 
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Taste for market ~· Health, edwcati,on, and marital status 
are available elements of this factor. Education (Ed) is measured by 
the highest grade of school completed. Educational attainment and such 
factors as health, productivity, and other variables may be positively 
related; therefore, spurious positive correlation may exist between 
(Ed) and (H). 26 
Dummy variables are introduced to control for marital status and 
health, Health restrictions affecting both the kind and amount of 
work performed by an individual are coded in the data. Limitations 
on amount of work would affect the number of hours individuals work, 
while restrictions on ki,nd of work should affect wage rates. Of the 
1,211 family heads in the FAP sample, 12 indicated that they were 
restricted in the amount of work they could perform, 45 reported re-
strictions in the kind of work, and 120 said they were restricted in 
the kind as well as the am<;>unt of work which could be performed. Since 
this study is concerned with hours of work, a dummy variable will be 
included in the analysis to control for the presence of restrictions 
on the amount of work performed. 
Taste for nonmarket work. The number of children (C) in the family 
below age 18 will serve as a measure of the family head's taste for 
nonmarket work. A child of the family head must have been under 18 
years of age and never married. Since the emphasis of this study 
relates to the labor supplied by family heads, only a portion of the 
general discussion presented in the last chapter concerning this vari-
able is relevant. It is expected that the larger the number of 
26 
· See Hill, p. 18. 
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children, the greater will be the incentive for family heads to sub-
stitute market for nonmarket activity. 
Market Variables 
Market variables are not directly available from the SEO data 
for such factors as unemployment rate or employment changes. In addi-
tion, individual records in the SEO data cannot be identified as living 
in a particular geographic area unless the subject lived in one of 
twelve large SMSA's at the time of interview. Thus, these market vari-
ables must be obtained from other sources and associated with only those 
families living in the twelve SM$A's. 
The 1967 unemployment rates (U) shown in Table VIII were obtained 
for each of the twelve large SMSA's by color and central city SMSA 
27 
designation, These 1967 rates were chosen for several reasons: 
(1) 1966 rates from the Current Population Sutvey (CPS) are not avail-
able. (2) A comparison of unemployment rates for these twelve SMSA's 
for the years 1966 and 1967, using state employment security data for 
both the insured unemployed and total unemployment rates, failed to show 
cause for not using the 1967 rates. (3) Estimates based on CPS data 
are considered to be more reliable than establishment data for the 
individuals under consideration. (4) Although the dependent variable 
is interpreted to represept total hours worked in 1966, the derived 
measure is actually based on hours worked during the week prior to the 
survey, which was conducted in March, 1967. 
27 The data source was the Manpower Report of the President 
(April, l968)j·pp. 2~5-297. 
TABLE VIII 
CIVILIAN IABOR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATE IN 12 IARGE 
STANDARD METROPOLITAN STATISTICAL AREA BY COLOR 
AND CENTRAL CITIES: ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1967 
Estimated 
Area and item Civilian labor Unemployment 
for eel rate 
Baltimore 
SMSA: Total 750 3.7 
White 330 2.2 
Nonwhite 200 7.6 
Central City: Total 400 5.5 
White 200 3.3 
Nonwhite 200 8.0 
Chicago 
SMSA: Total 2,800 3.3 
White 2,350 2.4 
Nonwhite 450 8.3 
Central City: Total t,500 4.3 
White 1,100 2.8 
Nonwhite 400 8.2 
Cleveland 
SMSA: Total 750 3.8 
White 650 2.8 
Nonwhite 100 8.8 
Central City: Total 250 5.8 
White 150 3.4 
Nonwhite 100 10.1 
Detroit 
SMSA: Total 1,600 4.5 
Whi,te 1,300 3.2 
Nonwhite 250 10.9 
Central City: Total 650 5.2 
White 450 2.9 
Nonwhite 200 9.8 
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TABLE VIII (Continued) 
Estimated 
Area and item Civilian labor Unemployment 
force rate 
Houston 
SMSA: Total 650 3.3 
White 500 2.4 
Nonwhite 150 6.3 
Central City: Total 550 3.7 
. White 400 2.7 
Nonwhite 150 6.3 
Los Angeles-Long Beach 
SMSA: Total 3,350 5.6 
White 3,000 5.3 
Nonwhite 350 8.0 
Central City: Total 1,300 6.6 
Wh:i,te 1,050 6.0 
Nonwhite 250 9.1 
New York ----...... --
SMSA: Total 4,650 3.7 
White 4,050 3.5 
Nonwhite 600 5.2 
Central City: Total 3,300 4,1 
White 2,750 3.9 
Nonwhite 550 5.3 
Philadelehia 
SMSA: Total 1,900 3.7 
White 1,500 2.9 
Nonwhite 350 7.4 
Central City: Total 850 4.4 
White 600 3.2 







TABLE VIII (Continued) 
































































2Estimate not provided by BLS when unemployment is less than 
5,000. Estimate calculated by extrapolation. 
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Source: Manpower Report of the President, Table D-11, "Civilian Labor 
Force and Unemployment in the 20 Largest Standard Metropolit&n 
Statistical Areas by Color, and Selected Data for Age, Sex, 
and Central Cities: Annual Average, 1967," (April, 1968), 
pp. 295-297. 
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The employment change measure (M) is the percentage change in the 
level of employment in a given SMSA between 1965 and 1966 based on 
28 
establishment data. These rates are not given by SMSA central city 
designation. 
One measure is available that may serve as an acceptable, albeit 
indirect, surrogate for demand conditions facing the individual. The 
respondent was asked the main reason he usually worked part-time work, 
(3) illness or disability, (4) did not want full-time work, (5) going 
to school or keeping house, and (6) other. 
In cases where the reason given for part-time work was either 
(1) slack work or (2) found only part-time work, it is assumed that 
area demand conditions were the constraining factor and a dummy variable 
is introduced to rep~esent these conditions. This rather tenuous 
assumption is discussed below; however, first it may be useful to note 
the instructions prepared for the interviewers concerning these two 
responses. The interviewers were instructed: 
Mark "slack work" for persons whose part-time work was 
because of work being slack at their plant or place of em-
ployment or if their hours were reduced because business 
was slow. This might include cases where a person's weekly 
schedule had been reduced below 35 hours a week permanently 
or for an indefinite period. 
Mark "could find only part-time work" if the person 
wanted full-time work but could find only part-time work. 
This would include cases where the person had to shift 
from a previous full-time t a different job which provided 
part-time work. Mark this category also for persons who 
28These rateE; were provided to the author by Malcolm Cohen, and 
were calculated from data published in Employment and Earnings, 
13 (May, 1967), p. 100-109. 
recently came into the labor market and who could fiµd only 
part-time work although they wanted full-time jobs .29 
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These instructions indicate that both types of responses are intended 
to reflect prevailing demand conditions in the local labor markets at 
the time of the interview. 
There are limitations associated with this "reason-for-part-time-
work" measure of demand conditions. First, responses are obtained only 
from part-time workers. This assumes that full-time workers are on 
their supply curves, which would not be the case if they desired to 
work additional hours at their given wage rates. Secondly, individual 
views concerning market factors are subjective and may or may not con-
form to actual market behavior. 
Summary 
The first portion of this chapter was concerned with a general 
description of the data with editing procedures used to draw various 
samples for analysis and specification of regression equations for each 
sample. The four groups selected for analysis were: (1) the working 
poor satisfying FAP eligibility criteria (FAP group), (2) the working 
poor who could not satisfy the FAP eligibility criteria because they 
had no children (WPWC group), (3) the working near-poor with children 
(WNP-C group), and (4) the working near-poor without children (WNP-WC 
.group). The remainder of the chapter included a detailed discussion 
of the variables available from the SEO data. Each of the variables 
2912.§2 Survey of Economic Opportunity Codebook, prepared by the 
Office of Economic Oppo~tunity, p. 203. 
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selected for regression analysis and their respective symbols are pre-
sented in summary form in Table X. 
The following chapter presents the results of the empirical 
analysis for each sample. Detailed findings for various groups within 


























SUMMARY OF SELECTED VAllIABLES 
Deacription 
number of hour• worked during the week prior to the aurvey 
number of weeka worked during the year 1966 
total houra ~ by the family head (L • HK) 
total earnings of the family head for the reference week 
hourly wage ratea of the family head (W • Ew + H) 
family income from aourcea other than earning• V • V +Vt, 
where Vw ia wealth income and Vt is tranafer income w 
total family income minus earnings of the head 
total value of debts of the family 
total value of family assets valued at market prices 
family's 'net asset or net worth (NA • A - D) 
.number of children in the family, where children.are defined 
as related individuals below age 18 or 18-2l'years of age and 
in school 
area unemployment rate associated with.family head's color and 
whether or not residence waa a central city (measure available 
only for families living in one of twelve large SMSA'a) 
employment change variable associated with each of the large 
SMSA's ofor 1965 and 1966 measured in per cent 
working wife 
married 
health limitation of family head with respect to amount of work 
which can be performed 
black family head 
female family head 
less than 25 years of age 
25-54 years of age 
more than 54 years of age 
less than 12 years of education 
12 years of education 
more than 12 years of education 
family heads who report that they found only part-time work because 
of either "slack" work or because "found only part-time work" 




The empirical findings will be presented in this chapter for each 
of the.sa~le-~ previously discussed: Working·poor with children (FAP), 
working near .. poor with children (WNP .. C), working poor without children 
(WP .. WC), and working near .. poor without children (WNP-WC). The results 
for each sample will be presented separately with the discussion format 
of the FAP sample providing the basic approach connnon to the other 
samples. A final section wil compare and sununarize selected findings. 
A detailed discussion of the various empirical findings is pre-
. sented in this chapter, The ;reader who is uninterested in this detail 
can proceed to the concluding section of this chapter for some general 
considerations about the empirical findings, and then proceed to the 
final chapter for further discussion of the economic interpretation 
and policy implications of significant findings. 
It should be emphasized that a basic concern of this research 
effort is to obtain reliable estimates for the income and wage vari-
ables, in order to calculate income and substitution effects. There-
fore, the effects of interactions and intercorrelations between the 
income and wage variables and the other independent variables were 
intensively explored. 
Unweighted regressions were judged appropriate for this study 
O'l 
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based on findings in other studies. 1 Multivariate.least squares was 
used to estimate relations among variables, with the caution that these 
·estimates should be interpreted with full recognition of the limitations 
associated with these procedures of statistical inference. 
In preliminary regressions based on the FAP and WNP-C samples, 
;~ong interactions were disqovered between the part-time nature of 
the family' head's work and both the income and wage variables, The 
part-time - full-time classifications were: full-time work weekly, 
full-time work hourly (FWFH); full-time work weekly, part-time work 
hourly (FWPH); part-time· work weekly, full-time work hourly (PWFH); and 
part-time work weekly, part-time work hourly (PWPH). In order to 
facilitate comparisons it was decided to split all the samples into 
groups b~sed on these classifications. 
FAP Sample 
The. format of this section will be to present the regression 
results for each of the groups in the FAP sample, followed by a discus-
sion of the estimated coefficients. Next, intercorrelations among the 
independent variables are analyzed. The effects of various interactions 
are also explored in this section as well as the estimation of income 
and substitution effects.' This.section concludes by examining the 
effects of various market variables. 
Selected regression results are reported in Table X for each of 
the groups in the FAP sample. All regressions utilized hours worked 
per year (L) as the dependent variable. Definitions of the estimated 
1see Malcolm S. Cohen, Samuel A. Rea, Jr., and Robert I. Lerman, 
! Micro Model of Labor Supply, BLS Staff Paper No. 4, pp. 193-198. 
TABLE X 
REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON TOTAL HOURS WORKED 
PER YEAR AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
FAP SAMPLE 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers .PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Incorne Vt'- Income Z-Incorne Vt:-Incorne · Z-Incorne Vt~Incorne Z-Incorne - -
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Y.ariant Variant 
Intercept 2468.7 2466.9 1550.3 1517.0 1661.3 1693 .1 654.6 670.3 
w -60.09** -60.42** -120.97* -132.83* ·4.98 -6.46 -7 .3& -9.20 
(3.75) (3.76) (2 .48) (2. 71) (0.31) (0.41) (O.S!O (0 .64) 
Vt -0.052 ------- 0.267** ------- 0 .188* ------- 0.172** -------
(0. 77) (3.45) (2. 99) (3.69) 
z ------- -0.022 ------- -0 .156* ------- -0.148** ------- -0.104** 
(0. 71) (2. 92) (3 .59) (2. 78) 
NA -0.010 -0.010 0.003 0.001 -0.03 -0.04* -b .·01 -0.01 
(1.44) (1.41) (0.34) (0.14) (1.84) (2. 07) (1.11) (0.98) 
D -0°.001 -0.001 0.027 0.031 0.02 0.02 0.01 Or02 
(0.20) . (0.14) (0.12) (1.30) (0.88) (0.95) (0.93) (1.69) 
c 0.462 1.-69 65.43* 69 .46* 22.44 27 .97 51.45* 47.25* 
(0.04) (0.16} (2. 76) (2 .89) (1.31) (1.63) (3 .40) (3.09) 
Ow -73.18 -63.05 -105.08 36.64 141.15 236.65 155 .25 217 .30 
(1.39) (1.15) (0.75) (0 .25) (1.15) (1. 93) (1.43) (1. 92} 
Orn 64.85 63.17 -~9.17 -81.32 -447.16* -497.30* 19.43 5. 9.1 

















































* = significant at the .05 level 
** = significant at the .01 level 
TABLE X (Continued) 
FWPH Workers FWFH Workers ·PWPH Workers 
Vt::-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income. , Vt::-Income 
Variant Variant Variant Variant Vari.ant 
362.08*-- 333.99* 39.57 49.55 ---=203.75* 

























































































"t" values are in parentheses, sign omitted 
00 
()'\ 
variables are found in Table IX of the previous cha pt.er, p. 82. 
Estimated Coefficients 
The coefficient of the wage rate variable (W) is significantly 
2 different from zero only for the FWFH and FWPH groups; higher wage 
rates are associated with fewer hours of work. The (W) coefficient 
may be interpreted to show, using the first regression equation for 
example, that a one dollar difference (increase) in hourly wages 
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among family heads is associated with a 60 heur difference (decrease) 
in total annual hours worked. 3 The negatively inclined supply curve 
indicated by this result implies that the negative income effect is 
larger· in a,bsolut;e value than the positive.substitution effect. 
The income var.iables, nonearnings income (Vt) and total family 
income less earnings of the head (Z), are shown in Table X to be 
significant for the FWPH, PWFH, and PWPH groups and each estimate has 
the predicted sign. Both the income variables (Vt) and (Z) are 
presented and discussed throughout the study for comparative purposes. 
The income coefficients show the change in hours of labor supplied 
associated with a dollar increment of the income measure. Both income 
measures were found not to be significantly different from zero for 
the FWFH group, implying that greater receipts df either (Vt) or (Z) 
2No interpretation is made of either the sign or the magnitude of 
coefficients if the estimate is not statistically significant at the 
5 per cent level. 
3The semantics of .this sentence are important because the data 
are of a cross-section nature. If these results are interpreted as a 
one dollar increase in the wage rate leading to a 60 hour reduction in 
yearly hours supplied,· an inter temporal quality has been inferred which 
may not be· justified. 
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are not associated with differences in hours worked. 
The estimated coefficient for (C) was significant in the equations 
for the FWPH and PWPH groups. As expected, he'ads of families with larger 
numbers of children supplied more hours of work per year. The effect 
of this variable was stronger fo~ the FWPH family head'.s labor supply. 
Married family heads (Om), in the PWFH group, supplied substan-
tially fewer hours than did unmarried heads. If the spouse is present, 
the married family head is male; however, the married family head may 
be either male or female if the spouse is absent from the household. 
The negative sign for (Om) was not expected and the value estimated for 
the coefficient is surprisingly large. 
Perhaps the unexpected results for (Om) can be explained by noting 
several facts concernipg the· PWFH group. This.group for the FAP sample 
was composed almost entirely of black families; 162 of the 167 in the 
group were black. Also, approximately 60 per cent of the families in 
·this group were headed by females. The simple correlation between (Om) 
and (Osx) was found to be -.916 which implies that most family heads 
were either married males or unmarried females. 
This intercorrelation was further explored by dropping (Osx) from 
the equation and estimating the coefficient for (Om). In unreported 
regressions omitting (Osx), the coefficient for (Om) changed signs 
and was estimated to be 58.45 (t = 0.69) and 49.33 (t = 0.58) for 
equations containing the (Vt) and (Z) income variables respectively. 
Such intercorrelations maf!ki; .the net relation of each variable when 
both are included in the same regression. The insignificant "t" values 
obtained from the unreported regressions are consistant with the find-
ings in the other groups. 
Family heads with health constraints on the amount of work they 
can perform (Oh) worked substantially more hours in the FWPH group, 
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but substantially fewer hours in the PWPH group, than did heads without 
such constraints. The positive values 362.08 and 333.99 for (Oh) 
for the Vt and Z income variant respectively should not be misinter-
preted. The positive sign shoµld not be alarming since the coeffici,ent 
for (Oh) indicates the differences in hours worked by health constrained 
family heads as compared with other family heads for each group of part-
time workers. Persons with health related constraints on hours of work 
would be expected to be classified in one of the groups other than the 
FWFH group; thus, comparisons are not being made between th~ health 
constrained family head and all other workers. 
In unreported regressions on the FAP sample where family heads 
were not separated into the various groups, (Oh) had an estimated 
coefficient of -174.28 (t = 2.32**) and -202.48 (t = 2.68'>'(*) for 
equations with (Vt) and (Z) as income measures respectively. These 
results do conform with expectations. 
Black heads of households (Orb) supplied significantly fewer hours 
per year (approximately 160 total hours less) in the FWFH group than 
their white counterparts. This coefficient for (Orb) is the number of 
hours supplied by black$ net of the effects of the other included 
independent variables. The effects of race on the wage and income 
variables are presented in the discussion of interactions, 
The coefficient estimated for (Osx) was significant only for the 
PWFH group; however, it has been indicated that (Osx) and (Om) are 
intercorrelated. In unreported regressions where (Om) was deleted, 
the estimate for (Osx) was -196.28 (t = 2.37**) and -200.59 (t = 2.407(·k) 
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for equations with (Vt) and (Z) as income.variables respectively. It 
is of interest to ~otethat although the magnit:udes of the coefficients 
were substantially reduced, the signs remained unchanged and the "t" 
values were still highly significant. The coefficient was of the 
expected sign~ supporting the hypothesis t:hat females have greater 
taste for unpaid work in the home. 
Although estimated coefficients which were insignificant are not 
discussed, it should be mentioned that education and age variables of 
a continuous form were also estimated in preliminary regressions. The 
coefficients for these continuous variables were found to be nonsignifi-
cant in regressions for all four groups. 
Intercorrelation 
When some of the independent variables are intercorrelated with 
one another the coefficients estimated for each variable will differ 
in magnitude~ and perhaps also in sign, as variables correlated with 
it are added to or deleted from the regression equation. Such instabil-
ity was illustrated between (Osx) and (Om) in the PWFH group. A major 
effort in this study is directed at determining posl:!ible intei:corre-
lations of the various independent variables with (Vt), (Z), and (W). 
Stability for these latter variables is important since they are 
utilized to estimate income and substitution effects. 
One procedure used to explore the effects of intercorrelations is 
described by Melichar: 
By observing the amount and direction of change in the 
coefficients obtained for a given factor as other factors 
are in turn added to or deleted from the·regression equa-
tion, one can ascertain which interco:rrelations masked 
















the underlying relationship between the dependent variable 
and the factor being stud,ied.4 
Quite stable estimates were obtained in all four groups for the 
coefficients of (W), (Vt), and (Z) in that intercorirelations between 
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each of these variables and other included independent variables were 
of little consequence. This desirable feature was also found in 
unreported regressions applied to a composite of the FWPH and PWFH 
groups, a composite of all part-time groups, as well as a composite of 
all groups. 
Mention should be made of the few weak intercorrelations involving 
either W, Vt or Z that were discovered. (W) was found to be slightly 
correlated with (Oh)' (Ow), (C), and (Vt) in both the PWFH and PWPH 
groups. (Vt) and (W) would be expected to be negatively correlated, 
as was found, if the receipt of (Vt) imposed constraints on the amount 
of work which may be performed to remain eligible for the income 
receipt. The part~time work allowed under such constraints would tend 
to be associated with lower paying jobs. Another possible explanation 
would be that if families having large numbers of children receive 
larger (Vt) payments and if 1arge proportions of family heads are 
female (PWFH = 60%; PWPH = 47%), child care may preclude them from 
full-time jobs with associated higher wage rates. This explanation 
suggests why (C) and (Vt) might both be expected to be at least weakly 
correlated with (W). 
It would not be surprising that (Oh) should be negatively related 
4Emanuel Melichar, "Least-Squares Analysis o;f Economic Survey 
Data," American Statistical Association Journal, 1965 l?roceedings of 
the Business and Economic Statistics Section, p. 381. 
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to (W) if part-time work, as mentioned above, tends to pay a lower 
wage rate and if individuals with health restrictions are concentrated 
in jobs of a part-time nature. This hypothesis warrants further inves-
tigation. 
(Ow) was found to be slightly intercorrelated with (W). It will 
be'~ecalled that (Ow) was introduced to control for the wage of the 
working wife, albeit a rough and perhaps inadequate measure .. (Ow) was 
a1so slightly intercorrelated with (Z) for both the PWFH and PWPH 
groups. This correlation should be expected since(Z) includes the 
wife'~ earnings. Actµally~ (Ow) should not be included when (Z) is 
the income measure. A more accurate estimate for the (Z) coeff:i,lcient 
is found in Table XI. 
Minor intercorrelation also existed between (Vt) and Osx). Female 
family heads were more likely to receive income from nonemployment 
sources (Vt) than male heads of households, l'his sh0uld be expected 
under current welfare programs (AFDC), 
Many of the coefficients of the variables intercorrelated with 
(W), (Vt), and (Z) were not statistically significant from zero. The 
regressions presented in Table X were reestimated with only the signif-
icant variables other than (W), (Vt), and (Z) included and the results 
are reported in Table XI. Intercorrelations among other independent 
vari~bles are not presented since, where they did exist, they did not 
influen~e the coefficients of (W), (Vt), or (Z). 
Income and Substitution Terms 
Income and substitution effects of wage differences as well as 
income, wage, and subs~itution elasticities are presented in Table XII. 
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REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATIONS INCLUDING ONLY SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES; 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER YEAR, 
FAP SAMPLE 
EWFH Workers FWPH Worke-rs 
Vt-Incom~ ~,..In~()~(;! ... Vt-}nc:o~e 































PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
_ Vt-1!1.l:~f!l~ .Z.:::J:I'l:S:~()me ,,._ Vt-Inc:ome ~-Income 






































(2 .59) \0 '-" 
TABLE XI (Continued) 
FWFH Workers FWPH.Workers PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-In.come Z-Income Vt-Income ~-I.~come Vt-Income Z.':"Income Vt-Income ~~Income ·-- ·-- - ' ~ .... .....- ... ..._...._.. Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant 
ORB -172 .03** -165.33** ------- -------
(3.93) (3. 77) 
------- ------- -·-----·- -------
R2 0.234 0.234 0.396 0.371 0.399 0.415 0.408 0.351 
N 452 452 222 222 167 167 193 193 
* = significant at the . 05 level 
*:~ = significant at the .01 level 
11t ft values are iri parentheses, sign omitted 
\0 .p. 
These computations are based on the regression results reported in 
Table XI. Regression coefficients with insignficant values were 
assumed equal to zero for computational purposes. 






income effect = L ~ 
~ubstitution effect = ~ - L ~ 
income elasticity = f ~ 
total wage elasticity = ~ ~ 
bt .. l .. w.Q1. E.ab SU s itution e asticity = L oY - L oY 
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Mean values of the wage rate (W), hours worked per year (L), the income 
measure (Y) selected (either nonearnings income, Vt, or total family 
income less earnings of the head, Z), and the earnings of the family 
head (E) were used in the computations. 
The estimates for both the substitution effect and substitution 
elasticity corresponding to the (Z) income variant were calculated 
based on the assumption that the cross-substitution effect between 
5 the family head's and other family members' leisure was equal to zero. 
This assumption was considered justified on the grounds that a family 
head may not have a spouse in the household and therefore no other 
wage earner mayexist. Where both husband and wife were in the family, 
5The cross-substitution effect for the family head measures the 
difference in labor supplied by the family head due to a difference in 
the wage rates of another family member, with income compensated so 
that the original family income remains unchanged. For a discussion 
of the cross-substitution term, see: Edward D. Kalachek and Frederic 
Q. Raines, "Labor Supply of Lower Income Workers and the Negative 
Income Tax," A paper prepared for the Presidential Connnission on 
Income Maintena,nce~ November, 1969, pp. 9-16; and Cohen, Rea, and 
Lerman, pp. 184-186. 
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both did not always work and wage rates were not available for individ-
uals not engaged in market activity. 
The direction of bias resulting if the cross-substitution assump-
tion fails to hold depends on the sign of the cross-substitution term. 
If the leisure of family members is complementary, the income effect 
is positively biased and the substitution term for the family head is 
biased in a negative direction. 
The estimates shown in Table XII have the expected signs except 
for the substitution effect and substitution elasticity of the FWFH 
group. According to traditional theory, the sign of the substitution 
effect is unambiguously positive. Only in Becker's analysis is allow-
6 ance made for the possibility of a negative substitution effect. The 
problem of negative substitution terms for this group is associated 
with the zero income values utilized in the computation of the term 
due to nonsignificant income coefficients. Furthermore, the negative 
and highly significant wage coefficient suggests that the income effect 
should be of a negative sign. Additional explanation concerning the 
appropriateness of the income measure is discussed in the final section 
of this chapter. 
Interactions 
The effects of various interactions on both income and wage 
variables were explored. In cases where interactions were 
6Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation' of Time," Economic 
Journal, LXXV (September, 1965)~ p. 505. Becker's ~ypothesis is not 
stated here, but is deserving of further empirical investigation on 
on this group. 
TABLE XII 
ESTIMATES OF INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS 





Items Variant Variant 
Income an<l substitution 
effects of wage differ-
ences 
Income effect 0.0 











































































significantly, modifications of the income and substitution effects 
and elasticities were made. Interaction variables 'used in this study 
were selected on an~ priori basis. The interaction effects of each 
of the following factors with the wage and income variables were 
considered separately: (1) race, (2) sex, (3) health constraint on 
hours worked, (4) educational level, and (4) age. In addition, the 
interactions of the following combined factors with the wage and 
income variables were also analyzed: (5) race and sex, (6) race and 
health constraint on hours worked~ (7) race and age, (8) race and 
education, and (9) age and health constraint on hours worked. 
Since the interaction terms incorporate dummy variables, the 
coefficient of the wage variable is the wage coefficient corresponding 
to the omitted class in the set of dummy classifications. For example, 
if the regression equation were L = b1w + b2Vt + b3osxw + b4 Osx Vt' 
then b1 is the wage coefficient corresponding to the omitted dummy 
class, male. The wage coefficient for females would equal b1 + b3 . 
similar interpretation is applicable to the income measure (Vt). 7 
A 
A statistically significant "t" value for b3 indicates that the 
wage coefficient associated with this dummy classification differs 
statistically from the wage coefficient of the omitted class. Specifi-
cally, the female wage coefficient differs statistically from the male 
wage coefficient. It is thus necessary to present estimates for the 
omitted class as well as the class depicted by a significant inter-
action term for comparative purposes. 
The income and substitution effects and the various elasticities 
7 See J. Johnston, Econometric Methods, (New York, 1960), pp. 221-
228. 
are modified for the different groups of the FAP sample in cases 
where significant interactions were discovered. These estimates are 
presented in Table XIII for the omitted class (OC) as well as the 
duIIDI1.y class associated with the significant interaction term. 
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Table XIII should be helpful in demonstrating the effects of 
interactions related to the various groups of the FAP sample. Only 
significant interactions are reported in the table. Interactions are 
shown for each group as well as both the Vt-income and Z-income vari-
ants. The economic interpretation of significant interaction terms is 
largely deferred to the final chapter. 
Under the FWFH heading of the Vt-income variant, in the table, 
there are four numbered groupings, representing different regressions 
in which significant interactions were found. The first grouping is 
interpreted as indicating that black family heads differ from white 
family head.s (OC) in the number of hours supplied per year associated 
with wage differences; however, no difference in hours supplied due 
to income differences is noted. The total wage, income, and substi-
tution elasticities are also shown in the table. Each elasticity was 
calculated based on the wage and income coefficients. For these 
calculations, nonsignificant coefficients are assumed ~qual to zero. 
The "t" statistic for the coefficients of the omitted class indicates 
statistical difference from zero; however, the "t" statistic for the 
coefficients of the other classes indicate statistical difference 
from the omitted class. The remainder of the table may be interpreted 
in the same fashion. Comparisons of various interaction effects are 
presented in the concluding section to this chapter. 




1. White (OC)a 
Black 
2. Male (OC) 
Female 




ESTIMATES OF INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS AND ELASTICITIES 
BASED ON SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS FOR THE 
FAP SAMPLE 
Wage Variable Income Variable Subs ti tut ion 
Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient. Elasticity Elasticity 
Vt-Income Vaiiant 
-35.19 -0.027 -0 .0772 (b) -0.027 
(2 . 08) (0.70) 
-178.2483 -0. us (N.S)c (b) -O. ll5 
(3.34) 
-59. 08 -0.042 -0.0160 (b) -0.042 
(3.78) (0.19) 
-158.52 -0.081 (N .S) (b) -0.081 
(2. 45) 
-36.64 -0. 02 9 0.0302 (b) -0. 02 9 
(2 .17) (0.14) 
-184.63 -0.125 (N.S) (b) -0.125 
(3.45) 









TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Subs ti tut ion 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Elasticity R2 
4. White, No Heal th ~35.30 -0. 02 7 -0.1815 (b) -0. 02 7 0.289 
Constraint (OC) (2 . 08) (1. 07) 
Black, No Health -180.84 -0.117 (N .S) (b) -0 .117 
Constraint (3.39 
Black, with -281.85 -0.161 (N.S) ~_(b) -0.161 
Health Constraint (2 .15) 
FWPH 
1. Male (OC) -8.80 (b) -0.3983 -0.057 0.677 0.428 
(0.16) (4. 09) 
Female -139 .14 -0.133 -0.1005 -0. 029 -0.028 
(2. 34) (2 . 00) 
2. White, Male -19 .20 (b) -0.3862 -0.036 0.670 0.466 
(OC) (0.34) (2 .20) 
White, Female -447.79 -0.457 (N .S) -0 .112 0.022 
(3.70) 
PWFH 
1. Black, age 3.41 (b) -0.0316 (b) (b) 0.419 




TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Elasticity R2 
Black, 55 and (N S) (b) -0.4378 -0.187 0.398 
older (2. 93) 
IWPH 
1. White, age -21. 05 (b) -0.2002 -0.142 0.557 0.481 
25-54 (OC) (0.40) (2. 04) 
White, less -230. 52 -0.762 (N .S) -0.136 -0 .100 
than 25 (2 .46) 
2 . Age 25-54, No -2 5. 38 (b) -0 .2377 -0.161 0.563 0 .511 
Health (0.62) (4.39) 
Constraints (OC) 
Over age 54, with 880.21 1.821 (N .S) -0.239 2.455 
Health Constraint (3.48) 
FWFH 
1. White (OC) -34.13 -0. 026 -0.0087 (b) -0. 026 0.283 
(2. 02) (0.12) 
Black -184.40 -0.119 (N .S) (b) -0 .119 
(3.49) 
2. Male (OC)5 -59.83 -0.043 -0.0227 (b) -0.043 0.267 
(3.83) (0.69) I-' 0 
"' 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Subs ti tut ion 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Elasticity R2 
Female -211.13 -0.107 (N .S) (b) -0.107 
(2. 35) 
3. White, Male -36.49 -0 .029 0 .02 78 . (b) -0 .029 0.317 
(OC) (2 .17) (0.34) 
Black, Male -193.87 -0 .132 (N .S) (b) -0.132 
(3.65) 
Black, Female -285.56 -0.148 (N .S) (b) -0.148 
(4.01) 
4. White, No -34.10 -0.026 -0.0133 (b) -0.026 0.290 
Health Con- (2 .02) (0 .17) 
straint (OC) 
Black, No -185.68 -0 .120 (N .S) (b) -0.120 
Health Con- (3.51) 
straint 
Black, With -304.96 -0.174 (N .S) (b) -0.174 
Health Con- (2 .11) 
straint 
5. White, Age -34.94 -0.02 7 0.005 (b) -0. 027 0.307 
25-54 (OC) (2. 06) (0.06) 
Black, Age -195.01 -0.127 (N .S) (b) -0.127 ...... 0 
25-54 (3.66) 
w 
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Subs ti tu ti on 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Co_efficient Elasticity Elasticity R2 
6. White, 12 yrs. -152.12 -0.102 0 .6985 0.068 -1.164 0.365 
Education (OC) (2. 6 9) (4 .17) 
Black, less (N .S) -0.100 -0.0485 -0.007 -0.042 
than 12 yrs. (4.38) 
Education 
Black, more (N .S) -0 .112 -0.4241 -0.035 0.392 
than 12 yrs. (2.91) 
Education 
FWPH 
1. Male (OC) -18.86 (b) -0 .2017 -0.086 0.343 0.403 
(0.35) (3.42) 
Female -159.43 -0.152 (N.S) -0.108 0.058 
(2 .41) 
2. White, male -23.88 (b) -0.2295 -0.073 0.3970 0.447 
(0.39) (2. 32) 
White, female -476.24 -0 .486 - (N .S) -0 .104 -0 .201 
(3.77) 
3. White, no -56.17 (b) -0.1838 -0.064 0.316 0.407 
health (0.94) (1. 97) 
I-' 
constraint 0 +:--
TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Subs ti tut ion 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coe.fficient Elasticity Elasticity R2 
Black, health -543.56 -0.485 (NoS) -0.068 -0.281 
constraint (2 013) 
PWPH 
1. 12 yrs. -101.20 (b) 0.0949 (b) (b) 0.404 
Educ. (OC) (1.63) (1. 07) 
Less than 12 (N. S) (b) -0.1048 -0.148 0.245 
yrs. Educ. (2 .14) 
More than 12 (N .S) (b) -0.4428 -0.138 0.151 
yrs. Educ. (2.24) 
2. White, male -55.61 (b) -0.1442 (b) (b) 0.425 
(OC) (1. 06) (1.71) 
White, female (N .S) (b) 0 .12 70 0.151 -0.257 
(2 .17) 
3. White, no -107. 72 -0.292 0.0187 (b) -0.218 0.390 
health con- (2 .18) (O .2 7) 
straints (OC) 
Black, no -3.21 -0 .007 (N.S) (b) -0.007 





TABLE XIII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient- Elasticity Elasticity 
4. White, age -23 .09 (b) -0.1700 -0.233 0.473 
25-54 (OC) (0.43) (2 .17) 
White, less -283.36 -0.938 (N .S) -0.219 -0.375 
than 25 (2 .46) 
White, 55 and (N .S) (b) 0.2661 0.425 -0.8169 
older (2. 73) 
5. White, 12 -166.64 (b) 0 .2004 (b) (b) 
yrs. educ. (1.23) (1.61) 
(OC) 
Black, less (N .S) (b) -0 .1064 -0.161 0.222 
than 12 yrs. (2.37) 
education 
Notes: a. (OC) indicated the omitted class for dummy variables. 
b~ The estimate is equal to zero because insignificant coefficients are assumed to be 
equal to zero. 
c. (N .S) The coefficient is not statistically different from the coefficient of the 
omitted class, thus, the coefficient for omitted class was used for computations. 








negative substitution elasticity estimates. One departure from this 
generalization, was found for black family heads with more than twelve 
years of education. A positive substitution elasticity was obtained 
for these family heads. 
Market Variables 
Three market variables were included in selected regressions as 
surrogates for the demand conditions facing the individual. (1) A 
dummy variable (Odq) was added which assumed a value of unity if the 
reason given for the family head working part-time was considered due 
to demand conditions. (2) The unemployment rates for each of the 
twelve large SMSA's by color and· central city designation were uti:-
lized.8 (3) An employment change variable associated with each of 
the twelve enumerated SMSA's was also utilized. 
The variable (Odq) was added to regression equations which included 
the variables presented in Table X. The coefficient for (Odq) was 
significant for only the PWFH group. The estimate was -372.24 (t = 
3.80~'(*) and -325.30 (t = 3.33·,b'() for regressions with (Vt) and (Z) 
as income measures respectively. The coefficient is to be interpreted 
in the following manner, using the Z-income variant of the equation 
as an example. The family heads who reported that the reason for 
their working part-time was due to demand conditions worked 325 hours 
less per year than did the family heads who reported other reasons 
for part-time work. 
8see the discussion in Chapter III for a more detailed presentation 
of both the unemployment and employment change variable. 
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It should be noted that only 24 of the 167 FWPH family heads 
associated their inability to work full-time with demand conditions. 
There was no evidence of intercorrelation between (Odq) and any of 
the wage and income variables. 
Unlike the variable (Odq), the unemployment ,rate and rate of 
employment change variables could only be applied to regression where 
the sample size of the various groups was further reduced. Observa-
tions on these variables were available only for the 12 large SMSA's 
mentioned in Chapter III. The various groups of the FAP and other 
samples were restricted to include only families living in one of the 
12 large SMSA's so that regressions incorporating these two market 
variables could be estimated. 
The unemployment rate was included in the regression equation as 
one of three dummy variables: (Oul), (Glum), or (Ouh), These variables 
indicated low, medium, and high unemployment rates according to rates 
of less than 3.0 per cent, 3.1 to 5.0 per cent and gr~ater than 5.0 
per cent, respectively. An employment variable (in per cent) was 
also used in selected regressions. This variable was included in 
regressions as one of three dummy variables: (Oml), (Omm), or (Omh) 
associated with employment changes of a specific SMSA of less than 
3.5 per cent, 3.5 - 5.0 per cent, or greater than 5.0 per cent 
respectively. These dummy variables are intended to represent low, 
medium, and high rates of employment change respectively. 
Only in the FWFH group was statistical significance accorded to 
one of the employment change variables. Family heads living in SMSA's 
with high rates of employment change (Ornh) supplied approximately 168 
more hours per year than did heads living SMSA's characterized by low 
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rates of employment change (Oml). This was the expected result, but 
no statistical difference was found between the (Onnn) and (Oml). No 
interactions between the employment change variables and either the 
wage or income measures were discoverd. 
Several interesting results were obtained in regressions ~pecified 
to include both the unemployment rate and employment change variables. 
It was not surprising to find some intercorrelation between the 
unemployment variables and the rate of employment change variables 
in all four groups. For the FWFH group, family heads living in SMSA's 
with high unemployment rates appeared to be more responsive to differ-
ences in the wage rate than heads living in SMSA's with low unemploy-
ment rates. Due to intercorrelation problems in all groups, the net 
effect of the wage rate could not be determined when these market 
variables were included in regression. Also, the number of observa-
tions for the dummy variables and interactions associated with the 
market variables were too small to produce reliable estimates. Even 
i.f reliable estimates could be obtained, it is not clear that the 
results of the groups restricted to the large SMSA's can be compared 
to the results obtained using the. larger sample size groups. 
The unsuccessful efforts to measure demand conditions by the rate 
9 of change of employment have been experienced by others. Cohen, Rea, 
and Lerman have worked with both the unemployment and employment change 
9see Edward D. Kalachek and Frederic Q. Raines, "Labor Supply of 
Lower Income Workers and the Negative Income Tax," A paper prepared 
for the Presidential Commission on Income Maintenance, November, 1969. 
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variables and have obtained somewhat better results in their studies. 10 
WNP-C Sample 
Results for the working near-poor with children are shown in 
Table XIV. The findings are presented for each of the four work 
classifications. 
Estimated Coefficients 
Good results for the wage variable (W) were obtained for this 
sample. The wage coefficient was statistically significant for all 
groups except the PWPH group. The signs of the significant coefficients 
were as expected. The absolute value of the wage estimate for the 
PWFH group was almost two and a half times that of the FWFH and FWPH 
groups, indicating a greater difference in hours worked associated 
with a difference in the wage rate for the PWFH group. The income 
measures, (Vt) and (Z), were significant only for the FWPH and PWFH 
groups. 
The coefficient for net assets (NA) was statistically significant 
only in the FWFH group, while the estimate for total debt (D) was 
significant only in the FWPH group. Neither the sign for (D) nor (NA) 
were as expected. Although intercorrelation existed between (D) and 
other independent variables, the negative association remained after 
dropping the variables correlated with (D) from the regression. The 
negative sign for (NA) is consistent with the findings by Egge and 
10cohen, Rea, and Lerman, ~Micro Model of Labor Supply. Their 
study included market variables mostly in the context of a labor force 
participation model rather than as hours of work model. 
TABLE XIV 
REGRESSION RESULTS ~ASED ON TOTAL HOURS WORKED 
PER YEAR AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
WNP-C.SAMPLE 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers .PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Ineome· Vt-Income Z-Income 
Variable Variant VMiant Variant Variant Variant Va-ria11t Variant Variant 
-Intercept · . 2095 2105 2411 2535 1658 1662 - 1402 1260 
w -56.74** -56.15** -43.22* -52.84* -122. 77* -138.37* 16.14 18.34 
(3.61) (3.58) (2 .46) (3.09) (2 .24) (2. 62) (1.22) (1.36) 
Vt 0.0414 ------- -0.2883** ------- -0 .2508* ------- -0.1195 -------
(0.81) ------- (3.46) ------- (2.79) ------- (1.21) -------
z ------- 0.0410 ------- -0.1972** ------- 0.2274**------- -0.0969 
------- (1.58) ------- (4 .02) ------- (3.74) ------- (1.31) 
NA 0.0110* 0.0109* 0.0332 0.0312 -0.0141 -0.0153 0.0203 0.0233 
(2. 01) (2. 00) (1.69) (1.62) (0.61) (0.69) (0.86) (1.01) 
D -0.0006 0.0001 -0. 0529* -0.0561* 0.0042 0.0117 0.0010 0.0017 
(0.09) (0.01) (2.28) (2 .46) (0.12) (0.38) (0.03) (0.04) 
c 14.27 12.07 82.00* 108.45* -18.75 -20. 77 -8.14 -2.08 
(1.21) (1. 02) (2 .67) (3.37) (0.59) (0.68) (0.21) (0.05) 
Ow- -7.48 -36.88 -45.15 118.13 -50 .54 16.99 -3.69 117. 01 
(0 .13) (0.61) (0.33) (0.84) (0.27) (0.09) (O. 02) (0.53) 
Om 297.66 287 .22 -491.34 -717.22* 305.09 306.54 -52.21 -20.37 
(1.55) (1. 51) (1.41) (2 .08) (0.95) (0.99) (0.09) (0.04) """ ~
""" 
TABLE XIV (Continued) 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-In-come Z-Income Vt-Income Z-lncome Vt .. Income Z-Income 
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Oh -74.18 -87 .86 -262.93 -356 .69 -161.89 -108.62 -189.62 -20L75 
(0. 74) (0.87) (1.a.2) (1.62) (0.73) (0 .47) (0. 97) (1.03) 
Orb -124.59* -131.99* -214.41 -110.96 -32.99 76 .02 291. 01 296 .60 
(2 .64) (2. 78) (l.73) {0.94) (0.23) (0.54) (1.63) (1.67) 
Osx 153 .02 148.92 -634.26 -815.53* 110.52 147 .11 -495 .24 -397.66 
(0.76) (0. 74) (1.82) (2. 38) (0.33) (0.47) (0. 92) (0.77) 
Oagl -25.15 -16.29 140.63 110.06 -188 .11 -195.39 57 .24 88.00 
(0.31) (0 .20) (0 .69) (0.55) (1.10) (1.19) (0 .29) (0.45) 
Oag3 67 .07 45.31 342.35 231.86 82 .32 169.55 -151.65 10.64 
(0.72) (0.48) (1.39) (0.97) (0.46) (0.98) (0.57) (0.03) 
Oedl 60.27 54.63 -269 .55* -178.90 -54. 77 -32.22 -434.16 -367.53 
(1.19) {1.08) (2. 00) (1.38) (0.34) (0 .21) (1.83) (1.58) 
Oed3 242.60* 241.54* 32.30 -55.08 464.94 362.65 287.67 325.81 
(2 .43) (2 .43) (0 .11) (0.19) (0.91) (0.74) (0.55) (0.62) 
R2 0.333 0.339 0.569 0.592 0.493 0.552 0.617 0.621 
N 376 376 106 106 77 77 49 49 
* = significant at the .05 level 
~* = significant at the .01 level 




support the conclusion that leisure may be an inferior good for this 
·11 
group of workers. The negative sign for (D) lends support to the 
hypothesis that debt incurred by this group resulted from the purchase 
of time intensive consumption goods. 
'. 
The number of children (C), sex of the family head (Osx), and 
level of education less than 12 years (Oedl) :were found significant 
in the FWPH group. (Osx') and l(Oed1) were significant only for the (Z) 
and (Vt) variant of the regression respectively, with each estimate 
having the expected si,gn. Intercorr~lation was discovere.d between 
(Osx) and both (Om) and (Ow). lt wa.s found~ in unreported regressions, 
that (Osx) failed to be significant'when either (Ow) or (Om) were 
removed from the equations. 
The dummy var_iable for black family h~ads (Orb) was significant 
solely in the FWFH grou,p·. ·This estimate was of the· expected sign, 
indicating that black heads worked fewer hours per year than white 
heads. Blacks accounted for 220 of the total 376 family heads in 
this group (Oed3) was also significant in the FWFH group and the. 
coefficient had the expected sign. This result.indicates that family 
heads with more than twelve years of education (Oed3) W()rked signifi-
cantly more hours per year than did family heads with just 12 years 
of education. 
Intercorrelation 
Intercorrelations of the various independent variables with (Vt), 
11Karl Egge, "Intercolor Differences in Labor Supply Among Older 
Men," presented at the Winter Mlaetings of the Econometric Society, 
New York, December 30, 1969, p. 23. 
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(Z), and (W) appreared not to be a serious problem for the WNP-C sample. 
The weak intercorrelations that were present in all groups involved the 
two income measures (Vt) and (Z) with (W) and (C). Additionally, in 
the FWPH group these income measures were also slightly correlated 
with (Oh). Minor intercorrelation between (W) and both (Ow) and 
(Om) existed in the PWFH group. 
The intercorrelations are referred to as mino+ since the value 
of the coefficients for each of the income and wage variables remained 
substantially stable, when using Melichar's procedure, as discussed 
in the FAP sample. Intercorrelations among the other independent 
variables were found to exist but since these intercorrelations did 
not affect the wage and income coefficients, they are not relevant to 
this study. 
Presented in Table XV are the regression results for equations 
omitting all variables which are shown in Table XIV as being insignif-
icant. 
Income and Substitution Terms 
Income and substitution effects and the various elasticities 
similar to those developed for the FAP sample are presented in Table 
XVL Other than the substituion tei;:ms for the FWFH group, the signs 
of the various estimates are the expected ones. An explanation for 
the negative substituion terms was suggested in the discussion of the 
FAP sample and further discussion will be provided in a later section. 
The wage coefficients for both income variants of the PWPU group were 
found nonsignificant, resulting in positive substitution terms. 
TABLE XV 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATIONS INCLUDING ONLY SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES; 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER YEAR, 
WN-P-C SAMPLE 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt .. Income. f-Income 
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Intercept 2454.20 2435.2 1884. 7 2204.9 1656.0 1792.7 1019.5 1066 .6 
w -52.87** -50. 96** -41.52* -54.34** -89.03* -109.85* 8. 70 9.79 
(3 .42) (3.31) (2 .44) (3. 30) (2 .12) (2.64) (0.74) (0.82) 
Vt 0.0275 ------- -0.2890** ------- -0.2864** ------- -0.1684* -------
(0.58) (3.76) (3. 78) (2 .16) 
z ------- 0.0461 ------- -0.2103** ------- -0 .2096**------- -0 .1150 
(1. 963) (4.61) (4.52) (2. 05) 
NA 0.0131* 0. 012 7'~ ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
(2.48) (2 .41) 
D ------- ------- 0.0389 0.0423* -------- ------- ------- _____ _,_ 
(1. 71) (2 .2 7) 
c ------- ------- 48.77 86.82* -------- ____ .,.._,_.,,., ------- -------
(1. 78) (3.03) 
Orb -128 .12~~* -143.65** ------- ------- ---=--- -------- ..., ______ --~~--= 
(2. 8 7) ( 3 .18) 
Oedl ------- ---~--- -242 .23 ----"'""'--.- -"-==-=- ===-="""'= _,.,,=-.==- <k>"'3<">'--"""""' I-' I-' 
(L88) Vl 
TABLE XV (Continued) 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income 
-- "•'A .... ·-~~·---"-·--~-~-·-- '••O~.-
Variable Variant Vatiant Variant 
Oed3 187.62* 197.37* -------
(2.0l) <2 .1st 
Om ------- ------- -------
Osx ------- ------- -------
N 376 376 106 
R2 0.287 0.302 0.472 
* = significant at the .05 level 
** = significant at the .01 level 
''t 0 values are in parentheses, sign omitted 








0 .. 532 
PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Vt-Income . z-.I~c::~.m~_. _Vt ~Income .Z-Income - ,_-... 
Variant Variant Variant Variant 
------- ------- ------- -------
------- ------- ------- -------
------- ------- ------- -------
77 77 49 49 






ESTIMATES OF INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS 






Items Variant Variant 
Income and substitution 
effects of wage differ-
ences 
Income effect 0.0 0.0 
Substitution effect -52.9 -51.0 
Elasticities 
Income elasticity 0.0 o.o 
Wage elasticity -0.046 -0.045 

























-391. 7 -286.7 
320. 7 176.8 





















The same set of interaction terms as discussed in the FAP sample 
was tested for statistical significance in the WNP .. c sample, Also the 
same procedures as used in the previous sample to derive the income 
and substitution terms and elasticities are followed in this sample. 
These calculations and the wage and income coefficients for the various 
significant interactions are presented in Table XVII. The table can 
be interpreted in the same manner as Table XIII. 
Market Variables 
The market variables discussed in the FAP sample were included 
in various unreported regressions on the different groups of workers 
in the WNP-C sample. The variable (Odq) faj,Jed to be significant at 
the five per cent level for any equation in which it was included. 
None of the various unemployment rates or employment change dummy 
variables was found significant for this sample. In the FWFH group, 
however, the interaction terms of the wage variable and each of the 
employment change variables (Omm and Omh) were found to be significant. 
Intercorrelations with other independent variables masked the net 
effect of these variables. It did appear that the wage coefficients 
for family heads living in either SMSA's of medium and high rates of 
employment change were negative as opposed to the positive wage coeffi-
cient for heads living in SMSA's of low rates of employment change. 
The wage coefficient for those living in SMSA's of high rates of 
employment change appeared to be of a smaller negative magnitude than 





1. White (OC) 
Black 
2. Male (OC) 
Female 
3. Age 25-54 
Over age 54 
4. Twelve yrs. of 
education (OC) 
TABLE XVII 
ESTIMATES OF INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS AND ELASTICITIES 
BASED ON SIGNIFICANT INTERACTIONS FOR THE 
WNP-C SAMPLE 
Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Coefficient Elastieity Coefficient Elasticity Elasticity 
Vt-Income Variant 
-195.22 -0.169 -0.1580 (b) -0.169 
(4.58) (1.69) 
-32.60 -0 .138 0.0796 0.058 -0.167 
(3.57) (2 .21) 
-54.21 -0.049 0 .1021 (b) -0.049 
(3.53) (1.40) 
-158.45 -0 .112 (N .S) (b) -0.112 
(2 .41) 
-50.38 -0.053 -0.0146 (b) -0.053 
(3.26) (0.28) 
(N .S) -0.032 0 .23.81 0.034 -0.332 
(1. 97) 
.,71.30 -0.068 -0.1832 (b) -0.068 









TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Elasticity R2 
Less than 12 (N .S) -0.063 -0.0018 -0.0001 -0.057 
yrs. of education (2 .16) 
5. White, Male (OC) -203.73 -0.178 -0 .1383 (b) -0.178 0.392 
(4 .82) (1. 30) 
Black, Male -32. 95 -0.030 0.2674 -0. 011 -0.514 
(3.78) (2 .84) 
6. White, no -208.30 -0.181 -0.1510 (b) -0.181 0.364 
health con- (4.83) (1.62) 
straint (OC) 
Black, no -33.59 -0 .023 0.076 0.006 -0.164 
health con- (3 .80) (2 .11) 
straint 
7. White, age 25-54 -204.79 -0.179 -,.0.1896 -0.008 0.187 0.385 
(4.79) (1. 99) 
White, -0ver 54 -418.57 -0.356 (N .S) -0.003 -0.073 
(2 .44) 
Black, less -54.90 -0.042 (N.S) -0.0002 0.252 




TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient · Elasticity Elasticity R2 
FWPH 
1. White (OC) -55.91 (b) -0.1816 (b) (b) 0.514 
(1. 05) (1. 95) 
Black (N .S) (b) -0.5286 -0.108 1.094 
(2 .22) 
2. Age 25-54 (OC) -37.53 (b) -0.3392 -0.095 0.739 0.551 
(1.68) (4.36) 
Over age 54 (N .S) (b) 0.3145 0.134 -0 .623 
{2. 93) 
3. White, no health - 77. 04 (b) -0.1575 (b) (b) 0.551 
constraint (OC) (1.39) (1.15) 
Black, with -516.18 ..... 811 (N.S) (b) - .8ll 
health con- (2. 02) 
straint 
Black, no (N .S) (b) -0.5506 -0.108 1.162 
health con- (2. 07) 
straint 
PWFH 
1. White (OC) -189.84 -0.182 -0.0759 (b) -0.182 0.474 t-' 
(0.61) 
N 
(2. 06) t-' 
TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elastieity Coefficient ·· Elasticity Elasticity R2 
Black (N .S) -0.107 -0.3897 -0.172 0.705 
(2 .12) 
2. Male (OC) -96 .11 -0.167 -0.0490 (b) -0.167 0.476 
(2 .28) (0.36) 
Female (N .S) -0.139 -0.3378 -0.053 0.428 
(2 .16) 
3. White, Male -106. 95 -0 .201 -0.0186 (b) -0.201 0.507 
(OC) (1.99) (0 .12) 
Black, female (N .S) -0.249 -0.4149 -0.155 0.542 
(2 .17) 
PWPH 
White, no 28.88 (b) -0.1039 (b) (b) 0.464 
health con- (0.51) (0.89) 
straint (OC) 
Black, no health 203.66 0.351 (N .S) (b) 0.351 
constraint (2 .14) 
Z-Income Variant 
FWFH 
1. White (OC) -190.46 -0.165 -0.0241 (b) -0.165 0.350 ~ N 
(4.43) (0.53) N 
TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Inca~ Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Etasti:city Coefficient · Elasticity Elasticity 
Black -32.93 -0 .02 7 (N.S) (b) -0.027 
(3.45) 
2. Male (OC) -53.05 -0.048 0.0383 (b) -0.048 0.328 
(3~46) (1.47) 
Female -162.79 -0.116 (N .S) (b) -0.116 
(2 .51) 
3. Age 25-54 (OC) -46.42 -0.044 0.0249 (b) -0.044 0.324 
(2.99) (0. 94) 
Over age 54 (N .S) -0.030 0.1303 0.072 -0.190 
(2 .03) 
4. White male -201.49 -0.176 -0.0226 (b) -0.176 0.380 
(OC) (4.69) (0.48) 
White female -430.11 -0.334 (N .S) (b) -0.334 
(2 .14) 
Black male -33.13 -0.030 (N .S) (b) -0.030 
(3.67) 
5. White, age 25- -208 .34 -0.182 -0.0256 (b) -0.182 0:397 
54 (OC) (4.64) (0.48) 
Black, under -37.14 -0 .028 (N .S) (b) -0 .028 
...... 
N 
age 25 (2 .19) 
w 
TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elastitity Elasticity 
White, over -411.98 -0.350 (N .S) (b) -0.350 
age 54 (2 .2 9) 
6. White, 12 yrs . -212.07 -0 .211 -0.0573 (b) -0.211 0.378 
of education (4.24) (0.59) 
(OC) 
Black, less -31.48 -0.027 (N .S) (b) -0 .02 7 
than 12 yrs of (3.44) 
education 
Black, more than -26.82 -0 .025 (N .S) (b) -0 .025 
12 yrs. of (3.05) 
education 
FWPH 
1. Male (OC) -54.09 -0.093 -0.1555 -0.111 0.271 0.551 
(3.33) (3 .12) 
Female (N .S) -0.059 -0.3326 -0.307 0.397 
(2.34) 
2. Age 25-54 -55.37 -0.083 -0.1983 -0.163 0.350 0.556 
(2. 51) (4.30) 
Over age 54 (N .S) -0.195 0 .2177 0.121 0.626 
(2 .07) t-' N 
+:-
TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Elasticity 
PWFH 
1. Male (OC) -121.45 -0.211 -0 .0820 (b) :.o .211 
(2 .89) (1.06) 
Female (N .S) -0.176 -0.1791 -0.282 0.125 
(2 .10 
2. White, no health -167 .54 -0.277 0.0052 (b) -0.277 
constraint (OC) (3. 00) (0.04) 
Black, no health (N .S) -0.265 -0 .2197 -0.159 0•.234 
constraint (2. 04) 
PWPH 
White, no health 8.10 (b) -0.0884 (b) (b) 
constraints (OC) (0.14) (0. 77) 
Black, no health 176.12 0.303 (N .S) (b) 0.303 
constraints (2. 06) 
Notes: a. (OC) indicated the omitted class for dummy variables. 
b. The estimate is equal to zero because insignificant coefficients are assumed to be 
equal to zero. 
c. (N.S) The coefficient is not statistically different from the coefficient of the 
omitted class, thus, the coefficient for omitted class was used for computations. 









The informational content o;f these findings for the market vari-
ables suggest that the exclusion of these variables from the final 
regression does rtbt seriously bias the results. The difficulty of 
making inferences based on the reduced samples of the various groupd 
associated with large SMSA's was noted in the discussion of the FAP 
sample. 
WP.,.WC Sample 
The regression results for the working poor families without 
children and primary indiv;i.duals (the WP-WC sample) are given in Table 
XVIII. 
Estimated Coefficients 
It is shown in Table XVIII that the estimated wage coefficient was 
significant for all groups except FWPH. Even though the estimate had 
the appropriate sign, the magnitµde varied greatly, between the various 
groups, 
Both income measures were significant in the PWFH and PWPH groups; 
however, only (Vt) was significant in the FWFH group. 
The dummy variable (OI), which was equal to unity when the family 
head was a primary indivi(\ual, was included ;i.n this sample as well as 
in the WNP-WC sample. The hypothesis that there was n.o difference in 
hours worked by primary individuals and the hours worked by heads of 
12 families was suppol'.'ted. The coefficient for (OI) was significant 
12 In the discussion that follows, the term "family heads" is meant 
to include primary individuals. 
TABLE XVIII 
REGRESS ION RESULTS BASED ON TOTAL HOURS WORKED 
PER YEAR AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
WP-WC SAMPLE 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers FWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-,Income z,.,.Income Vt-Income z,...rncome. Vt-Income Z-Income 
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant ·Variant Variant 
Intercept 3481.8 3471.7 941.4 1042.6 1991.8 1966.0 1099.9 1229.1 
w -739.0** -774.33** -31.46 -34.55 -309.1* -245.97* -41.47* -43.32* 
(4.97) (4.78) (0.99) (1. 09) (3.19) (2 .42) (2.10) (2 .16) 
Vt -0.6189* ------- -0.3704 ------- -0.6086** ------- -0.3367** -------
(2.61) (1.31) (4.05) (3 .60) 
z ------- -0.4493 ------- -0.3322 ------- -0.4742**------- -0.3484** 
(-1.81) (1.45) (3.55) (3.88) 
NA -0.0019 -0.0004 -0.0034 -0.0036 -0.0146 -0 .0234 -0.0013 -0.0017 
(-0.55) (0.12) (0.25) (0.27) (0.84) (1.35) (0.17) (0.23) 
D -0.0409 -0.0223 -0.0381 -0.0414 0.0555 0.0466 0.0314 0 .0272 
(1.50) (0 .80) (0.64) (0.70) (0.71) (0.58) (0. 90) (0. 79) 
or -166.20 -138 .73 -25.98 -202. 79 -222.27 ... 313 .40 -226.03 -328.50* 
(0.85) (0.70) (0.10) (0.66) (1.49) (1.91) (1.85) (2.59) 
Ow -769.07 -268.77 307.35 359. 72 229.42 360.16 -105.51 107.57 
(1.52) (0.55) (0.86) (1. 00) (0.74) (1.16) (0.59) (0.61) 
Om 100.49 121.87 6.25 -32. 71 255.75 243. 71 -135 .50 -148.45 
(0.44) (0.50) (O .02) (0.11) (1.17) (I. 09) (1. 03) (1.14) t-' ~ ..... 
TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Inc ane Vt-Income Z-Income 
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Oh 172.33 68.65 314.38 -337.99 -226.84 -214.20 -24.50 23.18 
(0.54) (0 .21) (0 .87) (0.95) (1. 96) (1.81) (0.26) (0.25) 
Orb 408.24* 378.33 105.74 106. 36 -157.52 -148. 77 4.45 -14.80 
(2 .19) (1. 95) (0.57) (0.58) (0.93) (0.86) (0.05) (0.17) 
Osx -416 .22* -422.41* 194.96 273.52 232.43 253.44 -90.99 -74.40 
(3.20) (3 .13) (0.92) (1.27) (1.54) (1.64) (0.90) (0.74) 
Oagl 873.90* 972 .10* 121. 59 148.52 -408.97 -389.80 -119.1-7 -150.58 
(3.10} (3 .20) (0.51) (0.63) (0 .81) (0.76) (0.65) (0.83) 
_ Oag3 75 .. 54 46.57 461.14* 428.41* -159.84 -174.77 -186.12* -208. 73* 
(0.69) (0.42) (2 .15) (2. 05) (1.51) (1.62) (2. 07) (2 .44) 
Oedl -614.79* -579 .16* 65.84 92.74 -161.59 -145.05 -35.86 -54.89 
(2.31) (2 .10) (0.26) (0.37) (0.76) (0.67) (0.25) (0.39) 
Oed3 111.12 128.25 -90 .17 -10.76 -480.18 -410.88 -108 .45 -133. 98 
(0.45) (0.50) (0.28) (0.03) (1.26) (1. 05) (0.61) (0. 77) 
R2 0.786 0.768 0.391 0.398 0.666 0.647 0.537 0.548 
N 59 59 77 77 86 86 120 120 
* = significant at the .05 level 
** = significant at the .01 level I-' 
"t" values are in parentheses, sign omitted N 00 
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in the Z-income variant of the PWPH group, but (Or) was correlated with 
(Z). In an unreported regression, the removal of (Z) from the equation 
resulted in a coefficient for (OI) of 172. 6 and an insignificant "t" 
statistic of 1.35, thus the coefficient is assumed nonsignificant for 
both income variants. 
(Orb) was found to be significant in the FWFH group, however, these 
results are obscured by intercorrelation. (Orb) was correlated with 
(Oagl) and (W). The "t" statistics for (Orb) in unreported regressions 
were 0.58 and 0.01 when (Oagl) and (W) were removed respectively from 
the regression equation. 
In the FWFH group; (Osx) was found to be statistically significant. 
This result indicates that female family heads work approximately 400 
hours per year less than do male family heads. 
Although (Oagl) was significant in both equations for FWFH, inter-
correlation existed with (W). In unreported regressions which omitted 
(W), the estimate for (Oagl) was 218.05 (t = 0.71) and 272.7 (t = 0.88) 
for the Vt-income and Z-income variant respecti~ely. In both cases, 
the coefficients became statistically insignificant. 
The older (more than age 54) family heads (Oag3) supplied signifi-
cantly more hours per year than did the prime-age _(25-54 years of age) 
group for the FWPll group, but significantly fewer; hours than the prime-
age group for the PWPH group. 
(Oedl) was significant in both equations for the FWFH group; 
however, again intercorrelation masked the coefficients. In unreported 
regressions when dropping either (Oagl), (Os~), (Orb), (Vt), or (W), the 
"t" statistic for the (Oedl) coefficient was statistically significant. 
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Intercorrelation 
Several intercorrelations among independent variables were men-
tioned in the previous section, The discussion in the present section 
will be limited to intercorrelations involving the wage and income 
variables. 
The wage variable was somewhat correlated with each of the follow-
ing variables in the FWFH group: (Oedl), (Oagl), (Orb), (Vt), and (Z). 
The wage variable appeared to be stable for the other groups. For 
this FWFH group, (Vt) and (Z) were correlated with (Oedl), (Osx), (Orb), 
(Ow), (Oagl), (D), and (W). When omitting each of the income measures 
and wage variables in unreported regressions, those independent vari-
ables correlated with each were reduced to statistically insignificant 
values. The only exception was the (Osx) variable. 
Minor intercorrelations were found in the remaining groups. It 
was observed that (Vt) and (Oag3) were slightly intercorrelated for the 
other groups. 
Income and Substitution Terms 
Due to the intercorrelations found involving the wage and income 
variables, equations were estimated which included only the wage and 
income variables. These results are reported in Table XIX for both 
the Vt-income and Z-income variants of the regression equation. 
The wage and income coefficients corresponding to the FWFH group 
had coefficient and "t" values of substantial],y different magnitudes 
in Table XIX as compared to their magnitudes in Table XVIII. This is 
the expected result of intercorrelation. Income and substitution 
estimates are thus, at best, only approximate for this group. 
TABLE XIX 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATIONS INCLUDING ONLY SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES; 
-DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER YEAR, 
WP-WC SAMPLE 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers PWPHWorkers 
Independent Vt,.._Income Z:-Income Vt-;Income .k-Inco.me Vt-Income .. Z-Income .. Vt-,J:.ncome Z-Income 
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant VaFiant Variant 
Intercept 2792 .2 2777.5 1225.5 1243.2 1537.1 1468 .1 743.1 736.8 
w -464.88** -438.24** -33. 72 -33.73 -249. 96* -205 .09* -44.60* -40.94* 
(3.62) (3 .42) (1.19) (1.19) (2. 73) (2 .11) (2 .28) (2. 03) 
Vt -0.1525 ------- -0.2160 -------- -0.6124** ------- -0.3830** -------
(1.85) (0.86) (4.94) (5. 02) 
z ------- -0.1234 ------- -0.1745 ------- -0.4296**------- -0 .2898** 
(1. 52) (0.96) (3.87) (4.06) 
N 59 59 77 77 86 86 120 120 
R2 0.437 0.419 0.160 0.167 0.533 0.465 0.442 0.378 
* = significant at the .05 level 
** = significant at the .01 level 





The income and substitution effects as well as the various elas-
ticities were computed based on the coefficients shown in Table XIX 
and are presented in Table XX. As found in the other samples, the 
substitution terms for the FWFH group had negative signs. The expected 
signs for the various computations were obtained for the PWFH and PWPH 
groups; however, disappointing results were obtained for the FWPH 
group since both income and wage coefficients were not significant. 
Interactions 
Few significant interactions were found in this sample. The 
interactions shown in Table XXI should be interpreted in the same 
manner as that for similar tables in the previous two samples. 
Market Variables 
Neither the variable (Odq) nor its interaction with any of the 
wage or income measures were found significant at the five per cent 
level for any of the groups. 
Due to the small sample size, it was decided not to estimate 
the market variables based on groups reduced to include only observa-
tions for the 12 large SMSA's. 
WNP-WC Sample 
The regression results for trre working near-poor families, includ-
ing primary individuals, who did not have children in the household 
are reported in Table XXII. 
TABLE XX 
ESTIMATES OF INCOME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS 






Items Variant Variant 
Income and substitution 
effects of wage differ-
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EST.IMATES OF INC<lm AND SUBSTI'IDTION EFFECTS AND ELASTICITIES 
BASED ON SIGNIFICANT !NTEBACTIONS FOR THE 
. WP-WC SAMPLE 
Group and Wage Variable Income Variable Substitution 
Interaction Coefficient Elasticity Co~fficient Elasticity Elasticity 
Vt-income Variant 
~ 
1. Whitl male -294.39 -0.537 -0.2468 (b) -0.537 
(OC) (3 .25) / (0.54) 




1. White male (OC) -150.57 (b) -0.085~ (b) 
(0.55) (0.56) 
White female -813.62 -0.152 (N.S) (h) -0.152 
(2 .10) 
~ 
1. White male -299.43 -0.547 -0.0022 . (b) -0.547 
(3.20) (O.Q06) 
Black male -24.12 -0.064 (N.S) (b) ;.o.064 
(2 .98) ' 
Notes: (OC) indicated the omitted class for dummy variables. 
;.. ... -
a. 
b. The estimate is equal to zero because insignificant coefficients are aaaumed to be 
c. 
equal to zero. • 
(N.S) The coefficient is not statistically different from the coefficient of the 
omitted class, thus, the coefficient for omitted class was used for computations. 









REGRESSION RESULTS BASED ON TOTAL HOURS WORKED 
PER YEAR AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
WNP-WC 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income 
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Intercept 2988.9 3072 .6 2008. 00 2439.4 1645.9 1670.4 2052.7 1993.3 
W,. -469. 92** -482.53** -18.14 -36 .27 -2.51 -3. 71 -138.82 -169 .49 
(4.12) (4.27) (0.55) (0.99) (0.29) (0.42) (1.18) (1.41) 
Vt -0 .1480 -------- -0.6837* ------- -0.5273* ------- -0.7674** -------
(0.64) (3 .47) (2.99) (4.39) 
z ------- -0.1964 --~---- -0.6074* ------- -0.4304"~ ------- -0.6074** 
(1.21) (2 .63) (2 .65) (4.41) 
NA -0.0246 -0.0257 0.0361 -0. 0064 -0.0158 -0.0195 0.0045 0.0028 
(0.93) (0.98) (0.59) (0.09) (0.87) (1. 04) (0.30) (0.18) 
D 0.0313 0.0306 -0.0427 -0.0344 -0 .113 -0.0885 0.1062 0 .0108 
(0.89) (0.90) (0.29) (0.21) (1.75) (1.35) (1.15) (0.12) 
OI 49.33 -43 0 96 284.97 -99.21 -330.34 -474.52 -510.29 -260.30 
(0.27) (0.22) (0.58) (0.17) (1.46) (1.83) (2. 04) (1. 07) 
Ow 11.15 30.62 300.82 543.55 50.32 300.64 -766.25~\- 102.92 
(0.05) (0.15) (O .88) (1.42) (O .17) (0.94) (3. 34) (0.49) 
Om 177. 91. 122.25 -283 .11 -188.70 388.58 308.43 -209.84 226.09 t-' 
(0.79) (0.54) (0.50) (0.31) (1. 38) (LOS) (O .80) (0.83) 
w 
Vl 
TABLE XXII (Continued 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income ~::-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-IncDme - ' Z-Income 
Variable Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant Va-riant Variant 
Oh 0.1358 5.50 1425.42* 1327.36* -584.44* -~622 .49* -607.48* -61.44 
(0.00) (0.02) (2. 90) (2. 50) (2. 44) (2 .51) (2 .99) (0.28) 
Orb -115.09 -104.24 -1144 .61** -1165. 79''(* -135.84 -76.58 -116. 03 -15.40 
(0.63) (0.59) (3.92) (3.69) (0.64) (0.36) (0.58) (0.08) 
Osx -77.71 -79.42 -1025 .2 7* -837.73* 724.05* 790.16* 50.96 5,7 .3.1 
(0.38) (0.40) (2 .78) (2 .15) (2.55) (2 .67) (0.29) (0.33) 
Oagl -391. 99 -383.20 -194.44 -407.13 -42 7. 9.7 -382.84 270.43 -49.97 
(1.63) (1.62) (0.43) (0.83) (1.19) (1. 04) (0.95) (0.18) 
Oag3 -96 .30 -101. 76 -684.19* -586. 96 -293 .29 -344.92 85.12 -203. 50 
(0.63) (0.68) (2 .2 9) (1. 77) (1.45) (1.68) (0.37) (1.00) 
dedl -87. 96 -59.59 1095.38* 977 .63 -256.36 -204 .77 -198.31 -302. 99 
(0.40) (0.27) (2 .47) (2. 02) (0.98) (0.75) (0.77) (1.20) 
Oed3 1054. 79* 113 7 .80* -585.00 -267.93 -1301.33* -1124.56* -426. 74 -610 .11 
(2. 99) (3 .18) (1.07) (0.49) (2. 78) (2. 36) (1.14) (1.65) 
R2 0.674 0.684 0.846 0.818 0.782 0.767 0.840 0.841 
N 58 58 39 39 40 40 35 35 
* = significant at the .05 level 
** = significant at the .01 level 




Only for the FWFH group was (W) found to be significant. The two 
income measures, (Vt) and (Z), were, however, significant for all 
groups except the FWFH group. These significant variables all had 
the expected sign, with some differences in magnitude of the income 
measure among the various groups. 
(Ow) was significant only in the Vt-income variant of the PWPH 
group. The coefficient for (Ow) is interpreted to mean that a family 
head with a working wife supplies 766.25 fewer hours than family 
heads without working wives or than primary individuals. 
Family heads with work affecting health constraints, as depicted 
by (Oh), differed significantly from those with no such constraints 
for the FWPH, PWFH and the Vt-income variant of the PWPH group. The 
existence of both positive and negative signs for this variable was 
discussed earlier as having to do with the comparison made within each 
specific group of workers. 
Black household heads supplied significantly fewer hours (approxi-
mately 1150 hours) than their white counterparts in the FWPH group. 
Female household heads in the FWPH group supplied significantly fewer 
hours per year than did male heads; however, in the PWFH group, just 
the opposite is the case. 
Household heads aged 55 or more, in the FWPH group, supplied 
significantly fewer hours than did the 25-54 age group. This is the 
expected relation. For this same group, heads with less than 12 years 
of education supplied more hours per year than did heads with 12 years 
of education. Heads in the FWFH group who had greater than 12 years 
of education (Oed3) supplied significantly more hours than heads with 
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only 12 years of education. For the PWFH group, the opposite was true; 
heads with greater than 12 years of education supplied fewer hours 
than those with only 12 years of education. It would be expected that 
these heads with more than 12 years of education classified as part-
time would tend to be composed largely of retired workers, thus explain-
ing the negative estimate for (Oed3). 
Intercorrelation 
Correlations between various independent variables and the wage 
and income measure were more sev~re for this sample. 
When (Oed3) was dropped from the regression in the FWFH group, 
the wage variable was estimated to be -3~6.30* (t = 3.04) and -354.90* 
(t = 3.05) for the Vt-income and Z-income variant respectively. In 
other unreported regressions, which omitted (W), the magnitude of the 
(Oed3) coefficie"Qt fell. by one half and the "t" statistic was insignif-
icant. 
In the FWPH group, (Vt) was slightly correlated with both (Oag3) 
and (Osx); however, (Z) was found to be somewhat correlated with (W), 
(Ow), (Orb), (Osx), (Oag3), and (Oedl). 
Similar correlation problems also existed for the other two groups. 
It was found in the PWFH group that (Vt) was correlated with (Oed3), 
(Oag3), (Osx), and (OI), and that (Z) was correlated with (Oag3), 
(Osx), (Oh), and (OI). For the PWPH group, (Vt) was correlated with 
each of the significant independent variables: (Oh), (Ow), and (OI); 
and (Z) was correlated with (Ow) and (W). 
Perhaps the small number of observations each of the groups 
of this sample is partly responsible for these poor results. It was 
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found that, although a large number of intercorrelations existed in 
this sample, the effects of these intercorrelations on the wage and 
income measures were not so strong as to preclude using the estimates 
of the wage and income coefficients. The values of these coefficients 
should be used with caution, however. 
Income and Substitution Terms 
Equations omitting nonsi~nificant variables and variables corre-
lated with either the wage or income measures were estimated for each 
of the four groups. These results are reported in Table XXIII. 
Based on Table XXIII, the income and substitution terms and the 
various elasticities were calculated. These results are shown in Table 
XXIV. Attempts to modify these various results by specifying.equations 
to include interaction terms were not made due to the small sample 
size of the v~rious groups. 
Market Variables 
The interaction between (Odq) and (Vt) was found significant at 
the five per cent level for the.PWPH group• Family heads who reported 
that the reason for their part-time status was due to demand conditions 
had a coefficient for (Vt) of -1.7531 (t = 2.04) as opposed to a value 
of -0.8075 (t = 4.77) for those who reported other reasons for their 
part-time status. 
Neither (Odq) nor any interaction terms involving (Odq) and the 
wage or income variables were found significant for any other groups. 
No attempt was made to estimate the unemployment rate or employment 
change variables due to the small sample size of the different groups. 
I 
TABLE XXIII 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR EQUATIONS INCLUDING ONLY SIGNIFICANT VARIABLES; 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE: TOTAL HOURS WORKED PER YEAR, 
WNP-WC SAMPLE 
FWFH Workers FWPH Workers PWFH Workers PWPH Workers 
Independent Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-Income Z-Income Vt-. Income Z-Income 
Variables Variant Va,riant Va-riant Variant Variant Variant Variant Variant 
Intercept 2811.8 2847.9 1564.1 1564.1 1247 .20 1288.4 1041.9 1380.33 
w -425 .42** -433.20** -66.17 -73 .20 -9.07 -10.51 ~'49 .81 -95.37 
(4.35) (4.45) (1. 72) (1.97) (1. 02) (1.18) (0.4-8-) (1.15) 
Vt -0.1407 ------- -0.6226* ------- -0.4058* ------- -0.4243* -------
(0. 77) (2 .49) (2. 51) (3 .14) 
z ------- -0.1549 ------- -0.5915* ------- -0.3427* ------- -0.5202** 
(1.21) (3. 08) (2. 37) (5.68) 
Oed3 1036.85* 1060.6* ------- ------- ------- ------- ------- -------
(4 .47) (4.62) 
R2 0.586 0.595 0.440 0.502 0.414 0.398 0.495 o. 713 
N 58 58 39 39 40 40 35 35 
* = significant at the .05 level 
** = significant at the .01 level 
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The significant findings supporting policy implication are pre-
sented in the final chapter. This final section of the chapter will 
contain some general considerations and comparisons concerning the 
empirical findings. 
The wage and income effects found for the various groups of the 
samples analyzed were generally of the theoretically expected sign. 13 
Several considerations and comparisons are noteworthy. Consider first 
the findings concerning the income effect. Negative income effects 
for the FWPH, PWFH and PWPH groups were obtained in the WNP-C, WP-WC, 
and WNP-WC samples, with the exception of the FWPH group of the WP-WC 
14 
sample because of failure to obtain a significant income term. For 
the WNP-C sample, the larger negative effects were found in the FWPH 
and PWFH groups; however, in the WP-WC sample the larger negative 
effect was located in just the PWFH group. The negative income effect 
for the WNP-WC sample, as in the FAP sample, was larger for the FWPH 
group. 
13It will be recalled that the four samples examined were: the 
working poor with children (FAP), the working near-poor with children 
(WNP-C), the working poor without children (WP-WC), and the working 
near-poor without children (WNP-WC). Each sample was separated into 
four groups based on the worker's full-time or part-time employment 
classification: full-time both weekly and hourly (FWFH), full-time 
weekly, part-time hourly (FWPH), part-time weekly, full-time hourly 
(PWFH), and part-time both weekly and hourly (PWPH). 
14conclusions concerning the various effects on work incentives 
were drawn from Tables XI, XII; XV, XVI; XIX, XX; and XXIII, XXIV for 
the FAP, WNP-C, WP•WC and WNP-WC samples respectively, Comparisons 
of incentive effects are based on comparisons of .effects in terms of 
hours. It should be noted that the PWPH group had the larger negative 
income elasticity. 
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The Fi\P sample had significant wage terms only for the FWFH and 
FWPH groups, with the larger negative term being associated with the 
latter. For the WNP-C sample, the PWPH group had the larger negative 
term. The most substantial negative wage effects for the WP-WC and 
15 WNP-C samples were found in the FWFH group. The FWFH group had 
comparable results between FAP and WNP-C samples and comparable but 
substantially larger negative results between the WP-WC and WNP-WC 
samples. Other comparisons of the magnitude of wage effects for the 
various groups across samples are not as meaningful because of the 
large number of nonsignificant wage terms obtained. Nevertheless, 
the largest negative terms for the FWPH and PWFH groups were found 
in the FAP and WP-WC samples respectively. The only significant wage 
term for the PWPH group was found in the WP-WC sample. 
The sign of the substitution terms calculated for the FWFH groups 
in all four were not consistent with theoretical expectations. Negative 
substitution terms were consistently found for the FWFH group in all 
four samples, A suggested explanation for the negative signs was 
presented in the discussion of the FAP sample. The explanation for 
the negative substitution terms was associated with the failure to 
obtain significant negative income estimates of a sizable magnitude. 
The only significant income coefficient found for the FWFH group was 
of a positive sign; the remaining estimates, while a negative sign, 
were not statistically significant. The assumption that nonsignificant 
income estimates are equal to zero leads to compensated substitution 
15Although the total wage elasticity and the wage effect in terms 
of hours could be used interchangeably in making comparisons for the 
FAP and WNP-C samples, such was not the case for the WNP-C and WNP-WC 
samples. 
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terms that are not of the expected sign. 
It was mentioned in Chapter IIX that underreporting of income 
associated with nonearnings income would bias the income effect. This 
bias is, however, not toward zero and thus would not account for the 
negative substitution terms. 
Due to the concern of the appropriate income measure, regressions 
were estimated where the income measure was selected from the various 
sources of transfer income. These categories separately included as 
income measures were: social security, government pensions, veteran's 
pension, private pensions, workmen's compensation, unemployment insur-
ance, public assistaqce and "other" transfers. Selected regression 
results for the various significant income estimates are presented in 
Table XXV, along with substitution and income terms and elasticities. 
Generally, regressions utilizing income variables based on source 
of nonearnings income failed to resolve the problem of negative substi-
tution estimates for the FWFH groups. One important exception did 
occur for the WP-WC sample where, in separate regressions, a social 
security (Vsoc) and a public assistance (Vpa) income variable had a 
significant negative coefficient. For both cases, positive substitution 
terms were estimated. 
Fairly good results were obtained using the 'Vpa-income measure. 
The coefficients associated with this measure and the resulting substi-
tution elasticities were approximate to those obtained for the non-
earnings income (Vt) measure. It should be noted that the results for 
the income coefficient may be negatively biased if there are institu-
tional restraints on hours worked associated with eligibility to 
receive particular types of income transfers. Such is the case for 
TABLE XXV 
SELECTED REGRESSION RESULTS, INGCME AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECTS AND ELASTICITIES 
BASED ON SIGNIFICANT INCOME MEASURES SELECTED BY 
SOURCE OF TRANSFER INCOME 
Sample Subs ti tu- Substitu-
and Income Wage Variable Income Variable tion Income tion 
Group Measure Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Effect Ef_fect___,~l_E_lastici.ty R2 
FAP 
FWPH Vpa -132. 90* -0.145 
(2. 74) 
PWFH ~soc -3.67 0.0 
(0.22) 
Vpa -3 .80 0.0 
(0 .23) 




FWPH Vpa -47.63* -0.076 
(2 .89) 
PWFH Vsoc -118.25* -0 .189 
(2 .15) 































-470.0 0.321 0.444 
-403.4 0.492 0.436 
-233.2 0.284 0.438 
-120.9 0.430 0.433 
-663.4 1.366 0 .630 
-582.7 0.987 0.479 




TABLE XXV (Continued) 
Sample Substitu- Subs ti tu-
and Income Wage Variable Income Vari ab le ti on Income ti on 
Group Measure Coefficient Elasticity Coefficient Elasticity Effect Effect Elasticity R2 
WP-WC 
FWFH Vsoc -717.13** -0.157 -0.9693* -0.012 1649.0 -2366.1 0.3-86 - 0.781 
(4.81) (2 .40) 
Vpa -767.38** -0.246 -1.1876* -0.010 2131.6 -2899.0 0.419 0.783 
(5. 04) (2 .47) 
PWFH Vsoc -291.94* -0 .2 78 -0.5042* -0.092 269.2 -561.2 0.161 0 .621 
(2 .85) (T:86) 
Vpa -348.29* -0.328 -0 .213* -0.023 500.8 -846.1 0 .33-3 0.598 
(3.34) (2 .16} 
PWPH Vpa -38.34 0.0 -0.3984* -0.039 216.4 -216.4 o. 784 0.479 
(1.87) (1.99) 
WNP-WC 
FWPH Vui -14.66 0.0 •L5389* -0.067 3406. 9 -2406.9 2.447 0.820 
(0.42) (2. 71) 
Vpa -7.55 0.0 -1.5056* -0.052 2354.9 -2354.9 2.394 0.845 
(0.23) (3.44) 
PWPH Vpa -78.97 0.0 -1. 946 7 -0.083 1393.45 -1393.45 5.076 0.741 
(0.54) (2. 37) 
NOTES: Vsoc = social security transfers "t" values are in parentheses, sign omitted 
Vui = unemployment insurance transfers * = significant at the .05 level I-' -P-
Vpa = public assistance transfers ** = significant at the .01 level °' 
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unemployment insurance and social security. 
One finding should be noted as being contradictory to the expected 
theoretical considerations. The coefficient for total family income 
less earnings of the head (Z) shou~d have a larger negative magnitude 
than the coefficient for nonearnings income (Vt). Such was not the 
finding; in fact, the opposite was generally the case. Kalachek and 
Raines found similiar results for male regressions in their study and 
16 suggested that a positii.re cro~s-substitution effect may be present. 
In contrast to Koster's conclusion, based on a different sample, 
that the substitution elasticity is probably close to zero for the 
hours component of labor supply, this study supports the finding of a 
positive term for groups other than the FWFH group. Interactions did 
support negative findings for the substitution terms for specific 
classes. But, some negative results would be expected since the substi-
tution estimate is the difference between two random variables. 17 
It is of interest to note which of the demographic groups tested 
were found to have the larger disincentive effects. Consideration will 
18 be given first to the FAP sample. For the FWFH group, black family 
heads as well as female family heads were found to have larger negative 
wage effects. This interaction was further refined to illustrate that 
large wage effects were associated with black male heads and black 
female heads, with the larger disincentive effect being related to the 
16Kalachek and Raines, p. 49. 
17 Cohen, Rea, and Lerman, p. 54. 
18comparisons of disincentive effects for demographic groups were 
obtained from Tables XIII, XVII, and XX! for the FAP, WNP-C, and WP-MP 
samples respectively. 
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latter. A large negative wage term was discovered for black family 
heads with health constraints on hours worked. Large disincentive 
effects associated with the income term were found for black family 
heads, both those with more than 12 years of education and those with 
less than 12 years of education. The former group was the only case 
in the FWFH group of the FAP sample for which a positive substitution 
term was calculated. 
The demographic groups having the larger disincentive effects 
for the FWPH group include the following: female family heads, espe-
cially white female hea<;ls, and black heads with health constraints on 
hours worked. 
For the PWFH group, only one demographic variable was found signif-
icant in the interaction specificatiOns .. Black fami,ly, heads, age 55 
and older had a large negative income effect. 
For the PWPH group, the larger negative wage effects were associ-
ated with white family heads with no health constraints on hours worked 
and with white heads less than 25 years of age. rt is interesting also 
to note that a large positive wage effect was obtained for family heads 
who were over age 54 and had health constraints on hours worked. The 
disincentive effects associated with the income term were greater 
among family heads with less than 12 years of education and family 
heads with more than 12 years of education, with the latter category 
having the large disincentive effect. The former was further speci-
fied as being primarily black family heads with less than 12 years 
of education. Two cases in this group had positive income terms, 
suggesting leisure may be an inferior good to these groups. They were 
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wµite female heads and white family heads over age 55. 19 
Interactions accou.nti.ng for the effects of various demographic 
factors on the wage and income variables were also specified for the 
WNP-C sample. A few significant findings are of interest. First, for 
the FWFH group, the wage coefficient was negative but of different 
magnitudes between the sex-.race characteristics. White female heads 
had a larger negative wage coefficient than did white male heads. This 
is in contrast to the large negative value for the black family female 
heads in the FAP sample. The wage coefficient for male heads was much 
smaller, absolutely, for black than for white family heads. Black 
male heads, however, had a larger negative income term. This was just 
the opposite of the findings in the FAP sample. As compared with the 
wage coefficient for white family heads ages 24-54, white family heads 
over age 54 had a wage coefficient with a much larger negative value 
while black family heads under age 25 were much less responsive in 
hours worked due to wage differences. These age-race differences 
were not significant in the FAP sample. 
Concerning the FWPH group, black family heads had a larger negative 
income effect than white family heads, but this difference was limited 
to black family heads with no health constraints on the amount of work 
performed. Black family heads with such health constraints had a very 
large negative wage term. The older age group, over 54 years of age, 
had a positive income term indicating that leisure is an inferior good 
19rt was not tested to see if further specification would have 
indicated this effect to be associated with white female heads over 
age 55. 
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to them. This was not found in the FAP sample. 
Two final findings should be mentioned. Black female heads in 
the PWFH group had a large negative income term. In the PWPH group, 
black family heads with no constraints on the amount of work performed 
had a large positive wage term. This latter finding was limited to 
this sample. 
It should be mentioned that interactions of demographic charac-
teristics with the wage and in.come variables yielded few significant 
. 20 
results for the WP-WC group. It was discovered that white female 
heads in the FWFH group had a large work disincentive associated with 
the wage effect. Black male heads in the FWPH group a much smaller 
wage disincentive effect than that for white male heads. 
20such interactions were not specified for the WNP-WC sample due 
to the small sample size of the different groups. 
CHAPTER V 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study has been concerned with the supply of labor of low 
income family heads measured in annual hours worked. Attention has been 
focused on family heads classified in one of four samples: 
1. The working poor witr children, designated FAP for family 
Assistance flan, is the focal group of current legislative 
attention. This sample includes only families whose income 
levels fell below the Social Security Administration's poverty 
1 threshold levels, who had children, and who had a working 
family head. 2 
2. The working near-poor with children designated WNP-C. Included 
in this sample are families whose income levels were greater 
than the poverty threshold income levels but less than the 
low-cost levels, who had children, and who were working family 
heads. 
3. The working poor without children designated WP-WC. This 
sample consists of families and unrelated primary individuals 
who were working, who had no children, and had incomes below 
1 
Families were con.sidered to have children if these children were 
under age 18 or 18 to 21 years of age and in school. 
2The working family head is a necessary distinction since this 
study is concerned with hours worked rather than labor force participa-
tion as a measure of labor .supply . . 
151 
152 
the poverty threshold levels, 
4. The working near-poor without children designated WNP-WC. 
This sample is composed of families and unrelated individuals 
who were working, who had income levels between the poverty 
and low-cost threshold levels, and who had no children. 
The FAP sample represents a subset of the families to whom benefits 
are most likely to be extended under.various proposed measures of 
3 welfare reform. For this reason the estimated relations for this group 
should be of particular interest. The remaining three categories pro-
vide information that can be used in estimating the labor supply effects 
on hours of work if program coverage were to be extended even further 
than is now under consideration. 
One of the objectives in this final chapter is to explore the 
findings concerning the work incentive effects of wage and income sub-
sides, It will be assumed initially th&t the tWQ basic features of an 
income subsidy are: (1) an income guarantee or lump sum transfer which 
is intended to establish a floor under the income of the target group, 
and (2) a positive marginal tax rate such that the additional income 
obtained from an extra hour of work will be less than hourly earnings. 
(In contrast, a wage subsidy scheme is one designed to increase the 
effective wage rate for individuals with inadequate earnings at pre-
subsidy rates.) 
Three effects on work incentives can be theoretically separated 
for analysis. An income effect arising from a positive lump sum trans-
fer will increase the demand for leisure, thus reducing hours worked. 
3This group conforms to a major portion of the coverage provided 
under the NixQn Administration's proposed Family Assistance Plan. 
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The positive marginal tax rate on earnings incorporated in subsidy 
schemes produces a wage effect which can be separated into an income 
and substitution effect. According to traditional theory, the sub-
stitution effect of a change in the effective wage rate must have a 
positive sign so that an increase in hourly earnings results in an 
increase in hours worked. The income effect of a change in hourly 
earnings will be negative in sign such that an increased wage rate will 
increase the demand for leisure as income rises. The empirical inves-
tigation of this study provides information concerning these various 
effects on work incentives for the different samples or target groups. 
One important finding is that the effect of various variables, 
including the wage and income variables, on work effort depends on the 
worker's full-time or part•time employment classification. Workers 
were classified as having worked: full-time weekly and hourly (FWFH); 
full-time weekly, part-time hourly (FWPH); part-time weekly, full-time 
hourly (PWFH); or part-time both weekly and hourly (PWPH). 
Work Incentive Effects 
The effects on work incentives differed between the full-time and 
ti 1 1 . f. . 4 part- me emp oyment c assi ication, Consider first the income effect 
on work effort associated with a lump sum money transfer. There 
appeared to be very little disincentive on work effort corresponding 
to the income effect for those workers who worked full-time both weekly 
and hourly in all samples considered. This conclusion is based on the 
4The reader is referred to the concluding section of the previous 
Chapter for a slightly more detailed discussion and comparison of the 
major income and wage effects. 
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assumption that the statistically insignificant income coefficients 
were equal to zero. The income effects were generally found to be 
negative concerning work effort for the other groups of the selected 
samples. In comparing the income effects for the various groups across 
samples, it was discovered that similar results existed between the 
FAP and WNP-C samples and between the WP-WC.and WNP-WC samples. The 
5 latter set, however, had substantially larger negative effects. 
Subsidy schemes containing a marginal tax feature would affect the 
net wage rate and would be expected to affect hours worked. The mar-
ginal tax feature would be positive in the case of an income subsidy 
and negative in the case of a wage subsidy. This wage effect is com-
posed of opposing income and substitution effects. The net wage effect 
was found to be negative (income effect dominated) for all cases where 
a significant wage coefficient was obtained; non-significant coeffi-
cients were assumed equal to zero. 
An interesting conclusion was made about the income and substitu-
tion effect for the FWFH groups. The income effect of a difference in 
wage rates will be negative, even though the estimated pure income 
effect is zero. This is true because the wage coefficient, having a 
significant and negative sign, indicates that leisure is a normal good 
and that a negative income effect dominates the positive substitution 
effect. This also suggests that the negative substitution effects 
calculated for this group in each of the samples selected may be sta-
tistical artifacts. The negative income effect of a wage difference 
5comparisons using income elasticities and comparisons based on 
effects in terms of hours were basically the same when analyzing 
across samples. 
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for the FWFH group is probably small for the FAP and WNP-C samples, 
although the effect appears to be substantially larger for the WP-WC 
WNP-WC samples. 
The income and wage effects were not as homogeneous among family 
heads with various demographic characteristics as might be implied 
from the above discussion. Viewing across the different groups in the 
FAP and WNP-C samples, family heads associated with specific demographic 
characteristics or combinations of characteristics appear to have larger 
d . . . ff 6 1s1ncent1ve e ects. It can be concluded that the larger the pro-
portion of individuals in the target population eli~ible for income 
mainteQance who are in one of the demographic classes having large 
work disincentive effects the greater will be the reduction in total 
work effort associated with the transfer payments. 
:Policy Implications 
The differential effects on work incentives within the target group 
may be of some concern for categorical iqcome maintenance programs. 
Supplemental policies and programs may be needed to increase the effi-
ciency of an income maintenance scheme. More specifically, programs 
providing day-care centers, for example, can affect the work incentives 
of females. Furthermore, it is generally acknowledged that one objec-
tive of income assistance programs should be to aid the recipient to 
become self-sufficient, Programs providing on-the-job training as 
well as those providing for basic education have recognized the need 
6The reader is referred to the concluding section of the previous 
chapter for the discussion of the demographic groups found to have the 
larger disincentive effects on work effort due to income and wage 
rate differences. 
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for a readily marketable skill. These latter programs should alter 
somewhat the degree of disincentives associated with the younger age 
group as well as with the group having lower levels of education by 
altering the opportunities available to each group. 
Additional policy implications ariSe when it is recognized that 
many of the demographic characteristics correlated with the greater 
work disincentives are concentrated geographically. Consider, for 
example, the ghetto of the central city. It has been recognized for 
some time that the better job opportunities are departing from the 
central city whereas ghettoes have tended to concentrate in and around 
the central city. This is not to say that "job" opportunities are not 
available to those living in the ghetto. It is interesting to note 
that although jobs may be available in adequate quantity in central 
city area, these jobs are usually the least desirable in most respects. 
Even where meaningful job opportunities exist, this information is not 
readily available in the ghetto. 
Doeringer bas pointed out that workers in the ghetto have poor 
work habits and job instability resulting from fluctuations in product 
7 demand. Referral services located in the ghetto which provide 
referrals to higher paying jobs may upgrade workers, and job experience 
may change work habits. These two results should alter the work incen-
tives associated with the wage and income effect. 
In summary, the interactions of various selected demographic 
7 Peter B. Doeringer, "Man,power Programs for Ghetto Labor Markets," 
Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged, ed. Peter B. Doeringer (Englewood 
Cliffs, N. J., 19,69), pp. 254-255. Most of the points related to the 
ghetto are discussed in this article. 
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characteristics with the wage and income variables indicate that an 
income maintenance program designed to combat poverty will lead to 
differential effects on work incentives among demographic classes with-
in the FAP and WNP-C samples. Note that the policy implications of 
these findings conflict with the goal of a noncategorical transfer 
scheme to supplant the various categorical transfer programs. It has 
been suggested that supplemental programs are desirable from the stand-
point of the objectives of an income maintenance program. Supplemental 
programs can reduce the sho~t-run cost of a subsidy program through 
their effects on work disincentives associated with the income and 
substitution effects. But more importantly, cost can be reduced in 
the long run when the objective to make the subsidized individuals self-
sufficient is realized because the number of recipients decline. 
It is most certainly not intended that the reader conclude that 
these supplemental programs should supplant an income maintenance 
program. These supplementary programs as the name i~plies are com-
plementary to, not substitutes for, an income maipte;nance program. 
The common characteristic among poor families is inadequacy of income, 
regardless of the number of hours worked. 
Work Incentives and Welfare Reform 
Many individuals and policy makers have held the notion that those. 
who work more, earn more, and then conclude that low incomes are a 
result of l~ck of effort. If, as suggested by the findings of this 
study, the labor supply curve is negatively sloped, this means that 
working individuals with low hourly earnings supply more hours, on the 
average, than do those·with higher hourly· earnings. It should be· noted 
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that for the FWFH group of the FAP sample the mean value for yearly 
hours worked is 2285 hours. 8 This implies that, on t:he average, family 
heads in this group worked more than full-time in terms of a 40 hour 
week, even if they worked 52 weeks per year. 
Only small disincentive effects associated with either the lump 
sum or tax features of an income maintenance scheme were found for the 
FWFH group of the FAP sample. This suggests that the appropriate con-
cern over provisions for welfare reform relating to this group should 
deal with problems other than the work incentive issue. Regardless of 
the subsidy scheme adopted, the average number of total hours worked 
per year for this group will decline somewhat, but probably not below 
what is normally interpreted as "full-time." 
One consideration should be emphasized and is deserving of addi-
tional investigation. It would be of interest to know the extent to 
which the work adjustment of the FWFH group due to a subsidy program 
would be a result of the termination or adjustment of "moonlighting" 
hours rather than adjusting hours worked on the more permanent job. 
This type of information wa-s not available in the SEO data. 
In the FWPH group, the income effect is stronger than the rtet wage 
effect. A lump sum transfer of say $1000 associated with a positive 
marginal tax rate of 50 per cent will lead to a reduction in hours 
9 worked. As the magnitude of the lump sum increases, so will the 
8 The mean values for the WNP-C, WP-WC, and WNP-WC samples were 
2314, 2441, and 2368 hours respectively. 
9This conclusion is based on Tables XI and XII. The wage elasti-
city times 50 per cent times mean hours worked per year gives the wage 
effect. This is then compared to 1000 times the income coefficient 
(income effect). 
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disincentive to supply hours of work, A wage subsidy in this case would 
have a definite disincentive effect, but of a smaller magnitude than the 
combination of the lump sum and marginal tax. 
A slightly different situat;ion exists for the PWFH and PWPH groups. 
These samples both have negative income effects associated with the lump 
sum transfer, but neither have a perceptible net wage effect. The wage 
effect appears to be composed of off-setting income and substitution 
te.rms. The combination lump sum and positive marginal tax plan would 
result in reduced work effort for these groups. It is interesting to 
note that a wage subsidy would have negligible effects on work incen-
tives. 
If, for good reasons, it is decided to implement the lump sum, 
positive marginal tax rate type scheme, concern over work incentives for 
the FAP sample-as a whole appears to be justified. To avoid these 
reductions in hours, work requirements have been suggested by some as 
a condition for eligibility to receive benefits. If we assume these 
requirements are set at the "full-time" level, it should be noted that 
the FWFH group may still possibly reduce total hours worked, but that 
might be socially justifiable. 
A full-time work constraint may mean that many of the part-time 
working poor simply do not participate in the poverty program. Addi-
tionally, individuals who work full-time, either because of choice or 
because of a work requirement, may have reduced opportunities for in-
vestment in human capital (education and training) due to time limita-
tion. Furthermore, poor family heads are not likely to become self-
sufficient in ter~s of an adequate earnings level by staying on 
a job of the typ' held by those in the FWFH group. The· following 
description is enlighting in this regard: 
.. Most disadvantaged workers can find employment, but 
they a~e usually limited to unattractive job opportunities 
which involve low wages, poor working conditions, employment 
instability, littie chance for advancement, minimal on-the-
job learning, and frequently harsh and inequitable supervi-
sion. In most of the tight urban labor markets of the late 
sixties, almost anybody who wanted to work could fine employ-
ment on his own and the high µriemployment rates in low income 
areas were largely the result of rapid turnover tesulting 
from the quality of the work available. Jobs were either so 
unsteady that people were continually thrown out of one job 
and forced to find another or the jobs were so unattractive 
that the unemployed often preferred to quit their jobs upon 
the slighte~t provocation and to prolong.the job search in 
hope of finding something better. The major failing of 
national manpower policy over the last seven years has been 
its failure to define the problem in these terms.10 
Several proposals temper the work requirement provision by pro-
viding the potential income transfer recipient with the alternative 
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opportunity of enrolling in a training program, the purpose of training 
programs being to upgrade·the workers' skills to qualify him to perform 
higher wage tasks. This assumes that higher wage job opportunities 
are available for the employment transition once the training period 
is completed. Also, the extent to which FWFH workers would choose to 
participate in training programs is not known. These are the very 
persons who are going to stay on subsidies as long as they continue to 
work in their present employment, ceteris paribus. "Incentives 11 for 
for retraining and relocating these workers are essential to a cost 
reduction in the income transfer program and to meet the objective of 
worker self-sufficiency in terms of income adequacy. 
In recognizing the limited meaningful employment opportunities 
10National Manpower Policy Task Force Associates Proposed State-
ment on Federal Manpower Policy, a draft of the policy statement issued 
July, 1970, p. 3. 
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available to the poor, many suggest making jobs available in the public 
sector. If these jobs are quality jobs of a permanent nature, this may 
be a consideration; however, if these jobs are of a temporary nature 
viewed as mechanisms whereby the poor will have to earn their dole, then 
the long-term solution to the poverty problem may be impeded. An 
exception to this would be when public employment could provide train-
ing in areas comparable to jobs in the private sector and where employ-
ment of the trainee is likely. 
The extension in coverage of an income maintenance program to 
include families other than those in the FAP sample should be consid-
ered. Families grouped into the WNP-C sample differed from the families 
of the FAP sample in that the former had income levels only slightly 
above the proverty threshold, 
The comments made about the FWFH group in the FAP sample concern-
ing work incentives apply to the WNP-C sample. The FWPH and PWFH 
workers both had work incentive effects such that the negative effect 
on work effort of a lump sum transfer would dominate the weaker positive 
. 11 effect of a positive marginal tax rate. Statements concerning the 
incentive effects of the PWPH groups for the FAP sample apply to this 
same group in the WNP-C sample. 
Although comparisons of the work incentive effects for the various 
groups can be made across the FAP and WNP-C sample, there are soma 
specific considerations to be made about the WNP-C sample. The fact 
should be recognized that, while the FWPH, PWFH, and PWPH groups are 
11The conclusion was based on TABLES XV and XVI and calculated 
in the same manner as done for the FWPH group of the FAP sample. 
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above the poverty threshold, they are working only on a part-time basis. 
The FWFH groups, however, consists of family heads who are working 
full-time and are 4t income levels slightly above the poverty threshold. 
It would seem that some attempt should be made to improve the quality 
of job opportunities available to the FWFH workers in this sample. 
As a matter of conjecture, and a possible area for future study, 
suppose an income maintenance plan were designed incorporating pro-
visions for job training and meaninkful employment in the public sector 
when quality employment opportunities are not available in the private 
sector. Eligibility for participation in this program would be limited 
to families whose income fell below the "poverty" threshold. How would 
the family heads who were working full-time yet with incomes slightly 
above the poverty threshold react to the increased long-term employment 
opportunities available to those eligible to participate in the program? 
Would they reduce their work effort to take advantage of, not the income 
transfer, but the increased long-term employment opportunities? This 
same consideration might also apply to the part-time workers, but 
probably to a lesser extent, especially if a work requirement exists. 
Next, consider the extention of eligibility to include families in 
the WP-WC and WNP-WC samples for participating in the income maintenance 
programs. Comparisons of the various work incentive effects for the 
FWFH group are more difficult in these two samples because much larger 
wage effects were obtained. Recalling the previous discussion about 
the separation of the income and substitution effects for this group, 
it appears that the income effect is a larger negative value for these 
samples than was the case for the FAP and WNP.-C samples. Still, the 
large negative wage effect may mean that the net disincentive effect 
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for a lump-sum, positive marginal tax rate scheme may be negligible, 
No significant estimates of incentive effects were obtained for 
the FWPH group of the WP-WC sample. For the WNP-WC sample, this group 
had a very large negative income effect and no significant total wage 
effect. For the WP-WC sample, the evidence suggests that the provisions 
of any subsidy scheme are likely to have few harmful effects on work 
incentives. For the WNP-WC sample, however, a wage subsidy may have 
negligible work disincentives, but a combination lump sum and tax scheme 
will most likely have significant effects on reducing work effort. 
These same comments for the FWPH group of the WNP-WC sample apply to 
the PWFH and PWPH groups of that same sample. Either a wage subsidy 
or a lump sum transfer with a positive marginal tax scheme would lead 
to a reduction in work effort. The latter scheme would tend to reduce 
work effort by the greater amount. 
In an effort to eliminate poverty, those families in the WP-WC 
sample should be included in the coverage of any income maintenance 
program. The evidence shows that work disincentives are, on the aver-
age, greater for this sample than for the FAP and WNP-C samples. Still 
these families are considered "poor" according to the Social Security 
Administration's poverty criterion. The work efforts may not be affect-
ed uniformly among the various demographic characteristics for the 
different groups of the WP-WC sample although few significant effects 
were found. Still, including this sample under the provisions of an 
income maintenance program, even if work requirements were present, 
would at least partially eliminate pov1rty, amon,~ the working poor 
families and unrelated individ4als without children (WP-WC sample). 
The r~sults of this study have been presented in this chapter by 
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making broad comparisons, This procedure is more meaningful for policy 
implications than relying on a precise estimate of a variable's coeffi-
. f 1 1 d 1 . . 12 cient or o a ca cu ate e asticity. Even if these estimates were 
slightly biased, the broad comparisons would be likely to hold. 
12This fact was made evident in comparing coefficients and esti-
mates across the two income variants of the regressions est~mated. 
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